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Creditors'
Rights in Future Interests
Traditionally, creditor? rights in future interests de-
pend upon whether the interests are alienable; if
so, creditors can, in bankruptcy and in many states,
subject the interests to their claims. Mr. Halbach
examines this rule, and in the light of conflicting
policy considerations develops criteria for a change
in the rule which he believes will more equitably
protect both creditor and debtor interests.
Edward C. Halbach, Jr.*
A GREAT deal of uncertainty remains in matters involv-
ing the availability of future interests for the satisfaction of creditors'
claims, despite legislative and judicial efforts tending to "modernize"
the law of real property as it applies to future interests. There is
lack of uniformity among the various states on the question, and in
several jurisdictions the rules are at least unclear because of conflict-
ing decisions within the jurisdiction which are hard to reconcile.
The outcome may be decided on the basis of a tenuous distinction
determining the label to be placed on the debtor's property interest.
Frequently, substantive rights of creditors hinge upon whether the
appropriate state remedy or federal bankruptcy proceedings are
chosen. The availability of future interests to satisfy creditors'
claims may also be important to a debtor considering the advisa-
bility of Ming a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. The question may
also arise in planning an estate, in quieting or evaluating land title,
or in determining what persons are entitled to receive the principal
of a trust upon its termination. It has frequently been said that the
rules of voluntary alienation are decisive of the problems of involun-
tary alienation-but this generalization will be shown to be far
from satisfactory. Nevertheless, cases involving creditors must be
analyzed in the light of the then existing law of voluntary inter vivos
transferability of future interests.
I. BACKGROUND- ALIENABILITY
Vested interests in remainder or reversion, even though subject
to open or to complete defeasance, were fully alienable under Eng-
* Member of the Iowa Bar
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lish common law,' and the rule was never subject to question in
this country.2 Since the estates were freely alienable, the early courts
had no difficulty agreeing that creditors could reach them., On the
other hand, future interests subject to conditions precedent were
originally held to be inalienable and thus not subject to claims of
creditors. 4 This was the result of the early common law view that
these interests were mere expectancies or possibilities rather than
existing estates, and that the transfer of these interests merely
tended to incite litigation.' Contingent estates, however, are gen-
erally no longer so characterized.' But due to some continued ad-
herence to early attitudes, a meaningful analysis of the rights of
creditors requires a detailed review of the present-day status of
inter vivos transferability of the various classes of future estates.7
Existence or nonexistence of the power to convey voluntarily is even
more important in bankruptcy where, as will be seen, it is entirely
determinative of the rights of creditors.
1. 4 SIMES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 1853 (2d ed. 1956).
2. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.67 (Casner ed. 1952); KALES, FUTURlE IN-
TERESTS IN ILLINOIS §§ 71, 122 (1905); 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §§ 131, 147(a)
(2d ed. 1920). See also 4 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 2230 (Rev. ed. 1940).
3. See BunBY, REAL PROPERTY § 275 (2d ed. 1954); 2 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 942
(5th ed. 1925); 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY ff 286 (1950).
In 1 FREMAN, EXECUTIONS § 178 (2d ed. 1888), the law at that early date was
stated as follows: "A vested remainder is clearly and undisputably subject to execution
at law against the remainderman. The same is true of an interest in reversion ....
4. See 1 FREEMAN, EXECUTIONS § 178 (2d ed. 1888); Kales, FUTURE INTERESTS IN
ILLINOIS §§ 74, 75 (1905); 4 SrmEs & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 1853 (2d ed. 1956).
5. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.65 (Casner ed. 1952); 1 FREEMAN, EXECU-
TIONS § 178 (2d ed. 1888); KALES, FUTURE INTERESTS IN ILLINOIS § 78 (1905); 4
SrmEs & SMrH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 1852 (2d ed. 1956); 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
§ 147 (b) (2d ed. 1920); Roberts, Transfer of Future Interests, 30 MICit. L. REv. 349,
352 (1931).
Continued but now contradictory use of this "mere possibility" reasoning to prevent
execution, even where the subject estate would be voluntarily transferable as "an
existing property right," is illustrated by Yancy v. Grafton, 197 Ga. 117, 27 S.E.2d
857 (1943).
6. See RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 5, 153, comment e (1936). See also Willoughby
v. Trevisonno, 202 Md. 442, 97 A.2d 307 (1953).
7. Whether future interests are available for the satisfaction of judgments involves
a consideration of: (a) the type of future interest in question; (b) local rules on volun-
tary transferability inter vivos; (c) local policy on forcing sacrifice sales; and (d) statu-
tory provisions as to procedures which may be invoked by creditors. See 2 POWELL,
REAL PROPERTY ff 285 (1950).
The classic definition of each type of future interest is set out in the note accon-
panying the textual discussion on voluntary alienation thereof. See notes 8, 11, 13, 17,
20, 21 infra. In characterizing the estate, as suggested in (a) above, all courts, of
course, do not apply these precise definitions. Considerations (b) and (c), above, are
discussed at length in text infra. Statutory provisions on procedure, (d) above, are
helpful both for possible enumeration of property interests subject thereto and for
the method of reaching the estate. The latter would reveal preliminary conditions to
be satisfied and the necessity of first exhausting other property or remedies. The
procedures, which vary widely from state to state, are not within the scope of this
analysis.
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All reversions 8 are inherently vested estates and are therefore
fully alienable everywhere.2 This is true even in the case of those
which are subject to complete defeasance.10 Similarly, all vested
remainders " are alienable inter vivos, regardless of the fact that
the interest may be defeasibly vested or "vested subject to open." ' -
However, as to other future interests, the law is not uniform and
is in some instances unpredictable. While a possibility of reverter 3
left in a grantor is probably transferable today in most of the
states which have passed on the problem, 14 there is contrary
authority." In the absence of a reasonably modem local decision in
8. A reversion is a future interest left in the transferor or his successor in interest
when one or more vested estates of lesser duration are granted or devised. All rever-
sions are vested, either indefeasibly or subject to complete defeasanc. See SLvms,
FUTURE IsrRunsrs § 9 (1951).
9. E.g., Wilson v. Pharris, 203 Ark. 614, 158 S.W.2d 274 (1941). See also texts cited
note 2 supra.
10. E.g., Fisher v. Easton, 299 Ill 293, 132 N.E. 442 (1921); Sinclair v. Crabtree,
211 Cal. 524, 296 Pac. 79 (1931); Young v. Lewis, 138 WV. Va. 425, 76 S.E.2d 276
(1953); RESTA mENr, PROPERTY § 159 (1936); 1 A,=cAN LAw OF PnopErmwy § 4.67
(Casner ed. 1952); 4 SamES & Szirrir, FuTuRE INTERnsrs § 1856 (2d ed. 1956).
11. A vested remainder is a future interest (1) which is created in a transferee
simultaneously with a preceding estate of lesser duration than that of the grantor and
(2) which is at all times ready to take effect as a present interest whenever and how-
ever the preceding estate terminates. This interest may be indefeasibly vested, vested
subject to open, or vested subject to complete defeasance. See Sams, FuTuRE I,-rm s
§ 10 (1951).
12. E.g., In re Dorgan's Estate, 237 Fed. 507 (S.D. Iowa 1916) (subject to com-
plete defeasance); Williams v. J.M. High Co., 200 Ga. 230, 36 S.E.2d 667 (1946)
(subject to defeasance); Thurston v. Buxton, 218 Ind. 585, 34 N.E.2d 549 (19-11) (in
personalty); Bogenrief v. Law, 9222 Iowa 1303, 271 N.W. 229 (1937); Grant v.
Nelson, 100 N.H. 220, 122 A.2d 925 (1956) (subject to divestment).
This is so even where contingent future interests are held inalienable (see notes 25,
27 infra). E.g., Steele v. Robinson, 221 Ark. 58, 251, S.W.2d 1001 (1952) (subject
to open); Greer v. Parker, 209 Ark. 553, 191 S.W.2d 584 (1946) (construing condition
as subsequent to reach this result); Stombaugh v. Morey, 388 IIL. 892, 58 N.E.2d
545 (1944); Bishop v. Homey, 177 Md. 353, 9 A.2d 597 (1939) (subject to defeas-
ance). See also RESTrATEmNT, PrtoPRsaY § 162 (1936).
13. A possibility of reverter is a future interest left in the transferor or his successor
in interest upon a transfer in fee simple determinable and automatically takes effect
in possession upon cessation of the determinable fee. (A determinable fee is character-
ized by a limitation generally introduced by such words as "until" or "so long as.") See
Samms, FuTuRE 1N'zEs-rs § 12 (1951).
14. E.g., Fitch v. State, 139 Conn. 456, 95 A.2d 255 (1953); Richardson v. Holman,
160 Fla. 65, 33 So. 2d 641 (1948); Austin v. Calvert, 262 S.W.2d 825 (Ky. 1953), 43
Ky. L. REv. 285 (1953); Lykins v. Board of Edue., 307 Ky. 24,209 S.V.2d 717 (1948);
Dickerman v. Town of Pittsfora, 116 Vt. 563, 80 A.2d 529 (1951); RrESATE.MENT"r,
PnoPERTY § 159 (1936). Statutes include Mmn. STAT. § 500.16 (1957) (definitions in
§§ 500.8-.12; Nu. REv. STAT. § 76-107 (1943) (as defined in § 76-101); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 70-1-21 (1953). See also probable applicability of statutes collected, note 23
infra; Roberts, Assignability of Possibilities of Reverter and Rights of Entnj, 22 B.U.L.
REv. 43 (1942).
15. E.g., LeSieur v. Spikes, 117 Ark. 366, 175 SAV. 413 (1915); Cookman v. Silli-
man, 22 Del. Ch. 303, 2 A.2d 166 (Ch. 1938); Magness v. Kerr, 121 Ore. 373, 054 Pac.
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point, it seems likely that a court would treat a possibility of reverter
as it would a contingent remainder or an executory interest."0 The
"modem" trend toward free alienability has not taken hold in cases
involving rights of entry for condition broken. 17 The general rule is
that this estate is still inalienable at common law even though the
condition has already been broken,' 8 but an exception is generally
recognized which permits transfer when the estate is incident to
a reversion. 9 The future interests most commonly encountered in
present-day litigation are contingent remainders20 and executory
interests.2 They are generally accorded the same treatment in
questions of alienability.22 Most jurisdictions have reached the
1012 (1927). There is a statute to this effect in Illinois. ILL. Biv. STAT. C. 30, § 37b
(1957).
This was the rule in several states before altered by statutes and would still apply to
transfers effected prior to enactment. See Consolidated School Dist. v. Walter, 243
Minn. 159, 66 N.W.2d 881 (1954) (deed prior to 1937 held ineffective).
16. See notes 23-27 infra and accompanying text.
Possibilities of reverter and executory interest are similarly treated under § 159 of
the Restatement. That they are generally alike, see 4 SndEs & SMini, FUTuRE INTMUESTS
§ 1860 (2d ed. 1956).
17. A right of entry, sometimes designated a "power of termination," is a
future interest created in the transferor or his successor in interest on the transfer of
an estate subject to a condition subsequent but takes effect only upon the holder's
re-entry or election to eject following breach of the condition. See SIMES, FTrrunI
INTERESTs § 13 (1951).
18. Denver & S.F. Ry. v. School Dist., 14 Colo. 327, 23 Pac. 978 (1890); Regular
Predestinarian Baptist Church v. Parker, 373 Ill. 607, 27 N.E.2d 522 (1940); Ralston
v. Hatfield, 81 Ind. App. 641, 143 N.E. 887 (1924); Dolby v. Commissioner, 283
Mich. 609, 278 N.W. 694 (1938); Farmers High School Dist. v. Parker, 240 Mo. App.
331, 203 S.W.2d 516 (1947); Helms v. Helms, 137 N.C. 206, 49 S.E. 110 (1904); cf.
Bangor v. Warren, 34 Me. 324 (1851) (held not leviable for reason that it was
inalienable). This result is even required by statute in North Dakota, des pito its other-
wise liberal legislation (note 23 infra). N.D. REv. CODE § 47-0902 (1943). This
restriction has been recognized by the American Law Institute (which considers all
other future interests freely alienable). REsTATrFENT, PRoPERTY § 160, comment b(1936).
In Texas a right of entry is, by judicial decision, fully transmissible. Perry v. Smith,
231 S.W. 340 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921). The growing number of statutes specifically
creating alienability for rights of entry include: CAL. Civ. CODE ANN. § 1046 (West
1954); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-502 (1949); MrnN. STAT. § 500.16 (1957) (as defined
in 9§ 500.8, .12); NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-107 (1943) (definitions in § 76-101); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 70-1-21 (1953); R.I. CEN. LAws ANN. § 34-4-11 (1956).
19. 1 TIFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 149 (1910). See also RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY § 161 (1936).
20. A contingent remainder is a future interest which is created in a transferee
simultaneously with a preceding estate of lesser duration than that of the grantor but
which is subject to a condition (other than termination of the prior estate) which is
precedent to its ability to take effect as a present interest. See Su.LEs, FuTumI INTELn-
ESTS § 10 (1951).
21. An executory interest in a nonvested future interest created in a transferee (1)
which will vest on the occurrence of a condition or event, certain or uncertain, and
(2) which, except after a determinable fee, vests in derogation of a vested interest. See
Sams, op. cit. supra note 20, § 10.
22. See Ingersoll v. Ingersoll, 77 Conn. 408, 59 Ad. 413 (1904); In re Clayton's
Estate, 195 Md. 622, 74 A.2d 1 (1950); Wood v. Watson, 20 R.I. 223, 37 Atl. 1030
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conclusion that these interests are valuable existing property in-
terests and have, either by statute 2 or judicial decision, recognized
that the owner can transfer them freely.24 At least three and prob-
ably four states adhere to the view that all contingent remainders
(1897); Medley v. Medley, 81 Va. 265, 269 (1886); cf. Axt. CODE ANN. tit. 47, § 137
(1940). See also joint treatment of these interests in RESTATEMEa-r, Pnoprrry § 162
(1936), and in 1 Am.rtmcA LAw OF PRoPERTY § 4.67 (Casner ed. 1952). However,
see text discussion in paragraph preceding note 56 infra.
23. Statutes in numerous states now provide free alienability in such clear terms
that there can be no doubt even where judicial authority is lacking. These statutes in-
dude: Ax-i- CODE AN. tit. 47, § 13 (1940); Amur. REv. STAT. ANN,. § 33-221 (1956)
("expectant estates" defined in §4 33-204, 205 to include future interests whether con-
tingent as to person or event); CAL. Civ. CODE ANN. §§ 693-99 (West 1954); InAo
CODE ANx. § 55--109 (1957) (read with definitions in § 55-106); Mscum STAT. Az.N. §
26.35 (1957) (definitions in § 26.9, .13); MInN-. STAT. § 500.16 (1957) ("expectant
estates" defined in §§ 500.8-.12); MoNT. REv. CODE ANN. § 67-325 (1947); NED. REv.
STAT. § 76-107 (1943) (definitions in § 76-i01b) (UNIForat PnoPmrv- Acr);
NEv. REv. STAT. § 111.105 (1957) (§ 111.010 defining "estate and interest" to include
contingent future interests); N. M. STAT. AiN. § 70-1-3 (1953); N.Y. REA PRop.
I.&w § 59 ("expectant estates" as defined in §§ 86-40); N.D. REv. CODE §§ 47-0215
to 0218 (1943); Omo REv. CODE AN. § 2131.04 (Page 1953); R.L GEN. LAws §
AiNN. § 34-4-11 (1956) (realty); S.D. CODE §§ 51.0217-0220 (1939); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 3529 (1955) (read with § 3535); Wis. STAT. § 230.35 (1957) (read with§ 230.08). Free alienation is also allowed in the District of Columbia. D.C. CODE ANNN. §
45--815 (1951). See also decisions in these states, Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank v. Kidd, 58
Cal. App. 2d 651, 137 P.2d 460 (1943); Bechard v. Union City, 71 S.D. 558, 27
N.W.2d 591 (1947); First Wis. Trust Co. v. Taylor, 242 Wis. 127, 7 N.W.2d 707
(1943); cf. Miller v. Miller, 127 W. Va. 140, 31 S.E.2d 844 (1944).
While several of the above statutes were preceded by cases changing the law to
permit transfer, in many of these states prior decisions had to be superseded by legis-
lative action. E.g., Peck v. Chatfield, 24 Ohio App. 176, 156 N.E. 459 (Ct. App. 1927),
and Luttgen v. Tiffany, 87 I.L 416, 93 AtL 182 (1915), had held contingent future
interests inalienable at common law.
24. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dower, 222 Iowa 1377, 271 N.W. 193
(1937) (contingent as to person); McDonald v. Bayard Say. Bank, 123 Iowa 413, 98
N.W. 1025 (1904) ("relying upon,' but really construing, statute); MeCartney v.
Robbins, 114 Kan. 141, 217 Pac. 311 (1923) (mortgaging); Weinberg v. Werft, 309
Ky. 731, 218 S.W.2d 398 (1949); Clay v. Clay, 199 Ky. 4, 250 S.W. 829 (1923);
Grimes v. Rush, 355 Mo. 573, 197 S.W.2d 310 (1946) (by quitclaim); Munday v.
Austin, 358 Mo. 959, 969-70, 218 S.W.2d 624, 630 (1949) (dictum re quitclaim);
Note, Alienation of Future Interests in Missouri, 1952 Ws. U.L.Q. 139; Merchants
Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207 (1953) (executory interest); Jerman
v. Nelson, 135 Ore. 126, 293 Pac. 592 (1930) (mortgaged); Love v. Lindstedt, 76 Ore.
66, 147 Pac. 935 (1915); Young v. Young, 89 Va. 675, 17 S.E. 470 (1893) (as se-
curity); Medley v. Medley, 81 Va. 265, 269 (1886) (dictum re executory interests).
In a number of these jurisdictions liberal but not conclusive statutory language has
been judicially interpreted as including contingent future interests. Others developed
rules allowing transfer without legislative "assistance."
Despite lack of modem decisions directly in point, in several other states complete
alienability seems certain. Indiana: McAdams v. Bailey, 169 Ind. 518, 532, 82 N.E.
1057, 1062 (1907) (dictum); cf. Gushwa v. Gushwa, 93 Ind. App. 68, 177 N.E. 366
(1931) (adjudicating fraudulent conveyance problem presuming effective transfer by
gift). Oklahoma: Adams v. Dugan, 196 Okla. 156, 163 P.2d 227 (1945) (denying
execution but seemingly conceding alienability). Texas: Gottwald v. Warlick, 125
S.W.2d 1060, 1061 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) (dictum re all expectant estates); cf.
Caruthers v. Leonard, 254 S.W. 779 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) (possibility of reverter).
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and executory interests are inalienable inter vivos. 25 Numerous
others have adopted a position which distinguishes between those
interests which are contingent as to the person who will take and
those which are contingent only upon an event, the latter sometimes
being labeled a "vested interest in a contingent remainder." 20 In
apparently eleven jurisdictions, interests which are contingent only,
as to event" are freely alienable, but if contingent "as to person,
they are inalienable even though the owner may be equally identi-
fiable and his rights no more uncertain.2 7 This distinction has, for
good reason it seems, been severely criticized.28 The question of
alienation is unlikely to arise in Louisiana where future interests
25. These states are the following. Arkansas: Deener v. Watkins, 191 Ark. 776, 87
S.W.2d 994 (1935); Love v. McDonald, 201 Ark. 882, 889, 148 S.W.2d 170, 174
(1941) (dictum); Note, Alienability of Contingent Remainders, 2 Aiuc, L. Rtrv. 87
(1948). Connecticut: Ingersoll v. Ingersoll, 77 Conn. 408, 59 Atl. 413 (1904). Illinois:
Johnston v. Herrin, 383 Ill. 598, 50 N.E.2d 720 (1943); DuBois v. Judy, 291 Ill. 340,
126 N.E. 104 (1920); Carey & Freeman, Alienation of Future Interests in Illinois, 31
ILL. L. REV. 1 (1936). Most likely this is also the Colorado view. See Barry v. Newton,
130 Colo. 106, 273 P.2d 735 (1954); Simes & King, Transmissibility of Future Interests
in Colorado, 27 Rocxy MT. L. REv. 1 (1954).
26. See, e.g., the use of this label in National Shawmut Bank v. Joy, 315 Mass.
457, 467, 53 N.E.2d 113, 120 (1944). Such expressions are used for situations in
which the owner is named or clearly determined as the person in whom the interest
will vest if the precedent condition is satisfied. This concept may also be expressed in
terms of the interest being so "limited to a person" that it could descend to the owner's
heirs on his death, as in the statutes cited note 27 infra.
27. In Maine, Massachusetts and New Jersey this is the plain dictate of statute. ME..
REv. STAT. ANN. c. 168, § 3 (1954); MAss. ANN. LAws c. 184, § 2 (1955); N.J. STAT.
ANN. tit. 46:3-7 (1940). See also Gould v. Leadbetter, 129 Me. 101, 150 Atd. 375
(1930); Tantum v. Campbell, 83 N.J. Eq. 361, 91 At. 120 (Ch. 1914).
This is the result of judicial decision in the following states. Delaware: Iluxley v.
Security Trust Co., 27 Del. Ch. 206, 214, 33 A.2d 679, 083 (Ch. 1943), and Gray v.
Corbit, 4 Del. Ch. 357, 371 (Ch. 1872) (also holdings); see also Note, Transtuissibil-
ity of Future Interests in Delaware, 30 TEMP. L.Q. 338 (1957). Maryland: In re Clay-
ton's Estate, 195 Md. 622, 74 A.2d 1 (1950), and Willoughby v. Trevisonno, 202
Md. 442, 450, 97 A.2d 307, 311 (1953). Pennsylvania: In re Twaddel, 110 Fed. 145
(D.C. Del. 1901) (applying Pennsylvania law and including review thereof at 149-52):
see also Note, Transmissibility of Future Interests in Pennsylvania, 42 DICK. L. R1Ev. 92
(1938). South Carolina: Roundtree v. Roundtree, 26 S.C. 450, 2 S.E. 474 (1887) (con-
tingent as to person held inalienable, conceding alienable if as to event). Tennessee:
compare Frank v. Frank, 153 Tenn. 215, 280 S.W. 1012 (1925) (person ascertained,
contingent as to event - alienable), with Nichols v. Guthrie, 109 Tenn. 535, 541-42, 73
S.W. 107, 109 (1902) (inalienable where person unascertained).
This is apparently the view of Mississippi: Hays v. Cole, 221 Miss. 459, 407, 73 So.
2d 258, 261 (1954) (dictum). But see Ricks v. Riddel, 200 Miss. 122, 134, 20 So. 2d
782, 784 (1946) (dictum) (re executory interest being alienable without qualification
as to nature of contingency). North Carolina: see Bourne v. Farrar, 180 N.C. 135, 101
S.E. 170 (1920), and Kornegay v. Miller, 137 N.C. 659, 50 S.E. 315 (1905) (by quit-
claim without consideration), both holding remainder contingent as to event alienable
but without really considering status of contingent as to person. Vermont: Blair v.
Blair, 111 Vt. 53, 10 A.2d 188 (1940) (like North Carolina cases supra). At least
this degree of alienability is recognized in Georgia. See note 30 infra.
28. See, e.g., 4 S.rNEs & Smr i, FuruRE INTERESTS § 1859 (2d ed. 1956).
(Vol. 43:217
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are not recognized,29 while in several other states the law on this
subject appears to be unsettled .3  Because inalienability is generally
based upon the attitude that contingent future interests are mere
possibilities rather than existing estates, it must be cautioned that
free alienability should not be presumed on the sole basis of statutes
providing substantially that all estates and interests are alienable
inter vivos 3 1 While these statutes are likely to be construed as in-
eluding contingent remainders and executory devises, 2 this result
is by no means certain.3 The position of the Restatement of Property
is that all future interests, with the exception of powers of termina-
tion,3 4 are freely alienable inter vivos. 35 This is, of course, in the ab-
sence of valid restrictions imposed by the grantor.3 The states which
have not accepted the Restatemenes position are declining in num-
ber.3 7
29. On prohibition against substitution under Louisiana Civil Law, see Marshall
v. Pearce, 34 La. Ann. 557 (1882).
30. In Georgia it is unclear whether free alienability is accorded aU contingent re-
mainders or only those where the person is ascertained. GA. CODE ANN. § 29-103
(1952) provides that future interests are alienable without reference to those which
are contingent, and an early case, Isler v. Griffin, 134 Ga. 192, 67 S.E. 854 (1910),
suggested that all contingent interests were alienable. However, somewhat more re-
cently Todd v. Williford, 169 Ga. 543, 150 S.E. 912 (1929), indicated that only those
contingent as to event were alienable.
Some inference of the attitude with which Florida courts will approach contingent
remainders and executory interests may be found in Richardson v. Holman, 160 Fla.
65, 33 So. 2d 641 (1948), recently deciding that a possibility of reverter is transfer-
able.
In Utah, Wyoming, and Washington there are statutes which could permit, but do
not require, free alienability. See notes 31, 33 infra.
31. E.g., UTAa CODE ANN. § 57-1-1 (1953); WAsH. REv. CODE § 64.04.010 (1954);
Wyo. CoaP. STAT. ANN. § 66-101 (1945).
32. See note 24 supra.
33. Narrow interpretation of such a provision is well illustrated by Magness v. Kerr,
121 Ore. 373, 254 Pac. 1012 (1927). Despite COLO. REv. STAT. AN. § 118-1-1 (1953)
providing that "any interest in real estate whatever" is transferable, the Colorado posi-
tion is still one of inalienability. See note 25 supra. Other examples include the Penn-
sylvania rule, note 27 supra, and the uncertainty in Georgia, note 30 supra.
34. REsTATE T, PRoPEaR § 160, comment b (1936).
35. RESTATEm T, PioPnrTY §§ 159-63 (1936) (§ 163 dealing with legal and
equitable interests in "things other than land").
36. See text at notes 119-21 infra.
37. See most recent judicial rejection of traditional common law rule in New Hamp-
shire in Merchants Natl Bank v. Curtis, 98 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207 (1953) (executory
interest).
Some indication of this trend and of the preference for transmissibility may be found
in cases making tenuous findings of vested subject to divestment (where the condition
is one generally held precedent) in states in which contingent estates of type involved
would be inalienable. See Greer v. Parker, 209 Ark. 553, 191 S.W.2d 584 (1946);
Hans v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 178 Md. 52, 12 A.2d 208 (1940); of. Fitch v. State,
139 Conn. 456, 95 A.2d 255 (1953) (involving a possibility of reverter but possibly
suggesting a changed attitude as to all contingent future interests); Hobson v. Hobson,
184 Tenn. 484, 201 S.W.2d 659 (1947) (an otherwise inalienable estate held "trans-
ferred in equity" for past consideration).
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As used in this context, freely alienable inter vivos means, in
effect, transferable withaut consideration by quitclaim deed to a
stranger to the title, since there are certain exceptions to the inaliena-
bility of future interests uniformly recognized even where certain in-
terests are otherwise held not to be transferable. 8 Much of the con-
fusion in this area can be attributed to these exceptions. Failure to
recognize them and to distinguish cases on the basis of these excep-
tions would render the decisions in many states irreconcilable. Oddly
enough, it has been the recognition of these exceptions which has
caused the courts some confusion in bankruptcy cases. 39 Inalienable
estates may be "assigned in equity" by a purported transfer for a
consideration; more accurately, this attempted transfer is treated
as a contract to convey which is specifically enforceable upon vest-
ing.40 The same estates may also be "transferred" as a result of
estoppel by deed when the purported conveyance is accompanied
by a warranty so that any after-acquired interest inures to the
benefit of the grantee.4' Finally, in accordance with the general
policy opposing indirect suspension of alienation, a valid transfer
of an inalienable estate will result from a "release" to the holder of
the estate to be divested or possibly to the holder of some other in-
terest in the property.42 These three exceptions were recognized in
38. See discussion of the three exceptions as applicable to Illinois, where inaliena-
bility is clearly the rule, in Carey & Freeman, Alienation of Future Interests in Illinois,
31 ILL. L. REv. 1 (1936). See also Roberts, Transfer of Future Interests, 30 Micn. L.
REv. 349, 354-56 (1931).
39. See text at notes 102-08 infra.
40. E.g., Bradley Lumber Co. v. Burbridge, 213 Ark. 165, 210 S.W.2d 284 (1948)
(even though by quit-claim; court talks in terms of estoppel); Cummings v. Lohr, 240
Ill. 577, 92 N.E. 970 (1910); cf. Kohl v. Montgomery, 373 Il. 200, 25 N.E.2d 826
(1940) (although legal title could not be passed, divorce decree awarding contingent
remainder to wife operates in equity). It should be noted that the above cases are
from states denying free alienability. See note 25 supra. Where estates contingent as
to person are inalienable but those contingent as to event are transmissible, such cases
are also still important. As to this exception in those states, see Bishop v. Homey, 177
Md. 353, 9 A.2d 597 (1939); Ralston's Estate, 172 Pa. 104, 33 At]. 273 (1895); Hob-
son v. Hobson, 184 Tenn. 484, 201 S.W.2d 659 (1947) (inalienable interest as security
even though without warranty and for existing debt); Gould v. Leadbetter, 129 Me.
101, 104-05, 150 AtI. 375, 377 (1930) (dictum).
41. Jernigan v. Daughtry, 194 Ark. 623, 109 S.W.2d 126 (1937); Pure Oil Co. v.
Miller-McFarland Co., 376 Ill. 486, 34 N.E.2d 854 (1941); Thames v. Goode, 217
N.C. 639, 9 S.E.2d 485 (1940); Nichols v. Guthrie, 109 Tenn. 535, 73 S.W. 107 (1902)
(contingent as to person); Gould v. Leadbetter, 129 Me. 101, 104-05, 150 AtI. 375,
377 (1930) (dictum). Where the above cases were decided, all contingent future
interests or at least those contingent as to person are held to be otherwise inalienable.
See also Phelps v. Palmer, 192 Ga. 421, 15 S.E.2d 503 (1941) (where there is still
some doubt as to extent of alienability); Vittitow v. Birk, 290 Ky. 235, 160 S.W.2d
624 (1942); Robertson v. Wilson, 38 N.H. 48 (1859) (then inalienable); Millison v.
Drake, 123 Ohio St. 249, 174 N.E. 776 (1931).
42. Dickson v. Neal, 2 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 556 (1925);
Shockley v. Storey, 185 Ga. 790, 196 S.E. 702 (1938); Nickerson v. Harding, 267
Mass. 203, 166 N.E. 703 (1929); Trustees of Calvary Church v. Putnam, 249 N.Y.
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early England 43 and are even applicable to attempted assignments of
pure expectancies, such as the hope of an heir apparent or that of
a probable object of a living person's bounty.44
11. B i T OF INDIVIDUAL CREDITORS
When a future interest has been mortgaged, the validity of the
mortgage and the secured creditor's right to foreclose it are gov-
erned only by the rules of voluntary alienation.45 If alienable, it
may be sold even during the continuation of the preceding estate
to satisfy the secured obligation although the interest may not be
subject to levy under applicable state law.40 A different problem is
111, 162 N.E. 601 (1928); Johnston v. Osment, 108 Tenn. 32, 65 SAV. 23 (1901);
Burche v. Neal, 107 W. Va. 559, 149 S.E. 611 (1929); Kohl v. Montgomery, 373 IMI
200, 209, 25 N.E.2d 826, 830 (1940) (dictum); Gould v. Leadbetter, 129 Me. 101
104-05, 150 Atl. 375, 377 (1930) (dictum). See also McDonald v. Bayard Say. Bank,
123 Iowa 413, 98 N.W. 1025 (1904) (alternative holding in initial decision findin8
free alienability). Transfer by release has been held applicable even to a right ot
entry. Calumet Council Bldg. Corp. v. Standard Oil Co., 167 F.2d 539 (7th Cir.
1948); Murray Hosp. Ass'n v. Mason, 306 Ky. 248, 206 SAV. 2d 936 (1947). Illinois
has a statute permitting it. ILT. REv. CODE c. 80, § 37g (1957).
43. Crofts v. Middleton, 8 De G. M. & G. 192, 44 Eng. Rep. 364 (Ch. 1856) (in
equity for consideration); Christmas v. Oliver, 10 B. & C. 181, 109 Eng. Rep. 418
(K. B. 1829) (estoppel through fine and common recovery); Lampet's Case, 10 Co.
Rep. 46b, 77 Eng. Rep. 994 (K. B. 1613) (release to possessor of estate to be divested).
See also FEARNE, CoNImErr RlnnminEs 365 (9th ed. 1831).
44. ArxixsoN, WILLS § 131 (2d ed. 1953); 3 ConnN, CoNT.Ac'rs § 735 (1951); 1
PATroN, TrrLF-s §§ 213, 215-17 (2d ed. 1957); 4 PAcE, WILLS § 1600 (Lifetime ed.
1941). Release, however, is effective only if given for consideration. ATrMNsoN, WLlS §
130 (2d ed. 1953).
45. Compare valid mortgages of alienable interests in Stombaugh v. Morey, 388 IlL.
392, 58 N.E.2d 545 (1944) (vested subject to defeasance), and Thurston v. Buxton,
218 Ind. 585, 34 N.E.2d 549 (1941) (remainder in personal property), with ineffective
attempt where interest was inalienable in Love v. McDonald, 201 Ark. 882, 148 S.W.
2d 170 (1941) (contingent remainder).
"[The contingent remainder] may be sold and property which mar be sold may be
mortgaged." Ward v. Ward, 131 Fed. 946, 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1904), aff d, 145 Fed. 1023
(2d Cir. 1906). "If he took ... a vested remainder [he] was authorized to convey
his title to the trustee in the deed of trust.... If on the other hand [he] took only a
contingent remainder . . . the deed of trust he executed conveyd no title... ." Pin-
nell v. Dowtin, 224 N.C. 493, 496-97, 31 S.E.2d 467, 469 (1944) (where contingent
remainder of type involved would be inalienable).
However, an attempt to mortgage an inalienable remainder may create equitably
sufficient rights. Bradley Lumber Co. v. Burbridge, 213 Ark. 165, 210 S.V.2d 284
(1948); Bishop v. Homey, 177 Md. 353,356, 9 A.2d 597, 599 (1939) (dictum) ("But
even if the remainders in the present case were contingent, a court of equity would
nevertheless enforce the mortgage"). This is in accord with rules on voluntary aliena-
tion for consideration discussed in text at note 40 supra.
46. Bradley Lumber Co. v. Burbridge, 213 Ark. 165, 210 S.W.2d 284 (1948) (con-
tingent remainder mortgaged in equity but would clearly be immune from execution);
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dower, 222 Iowa 1377, 271 N.W. 193 (1937)
(alienable contingent remainder which would clearly not have been subject to execu-
tion); McCartney v. Robbins, 114 Kan. 141, 217 Pac. 811 (1923) (alienable contingent
remainder); Hurst v. Russell, 257 Ky. 78, 77 SAV.2d 855 (1934) (alienable contingent
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presented, however, when the creditor seeking to reach the estate
has not been granted a security interest therein by the debtor. It is
immediately clear that if the estate is not freely alienable, the fact
that it is inalienable will preclude a creditor from reaching it."7 The
converse cannot safely be said. Except in bankruptcy, 4 voluntary
alienability is not necessarily conclusive of an estate's availability
to a creditor. It is only a preliminary requirement since other fac-
tors, to be discussed hereafter, must also be considered when the
estate is contingent.
No uncertainty is caused by the mere futurity of a vested interest.
A creditor may obtain execution against a reversion whether it be
indefeasible or defeasible. 4 The same is true of remainders vested
absolutely, vested subject to open, or vested subject to a condition
subsequent which would totally destroy the estate."0 At the other
extreme expectancies in the strict sense are clearly not available to
creditors.51
Other types of future interests are not always alienable. Inaliena-
bility under state law will be sufficient in the case of a possibility
of reverter, right of entry, contingent remainder, or executory in-
remainder); Bishop v. Homey, 177 Md. 353, 9 A.2d 597 (1939) (defeasible remain-
der); Muzzy v. Muzzy, 364 Mo. 373, 261 S.W.2d 927 (1953) (defensible remainder);
Jerman v. Nelson, 135 Ore. 126, 293 Pac. 592 (1930) (alienable contingent remain-
der); E. A. Beall Co. v. Weston, 83 S.C. 491, 65 S.E. 823 (1909) (contingent remainder
not subject to execution). See also 16 J.B.A. KAN. 241 (1947).
47. See RESTATEMfENT, PROPERTY § 166 (1936).
48. See text at notes 96-101 infra.
49. Burton v. Smith, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 464 (1889); First Nat'l Bank v. Pointer, 174
Tenn. 472, 126 S.W.2d 335 (1939) (defeasible, in personality); McKenna v. Seattle-
First Nat'l Bank, 35 Wash. 2d 662, 214 P.2d 664 (1950) (reversion resulting from ap-
plication of inter vivos branch of doctrine of worthier title); Young v. Lewis, 138 W.
Va. 425, 76 S.E.2d 276 (1953) (defeasible); KAiEs, FUTUnE INTRESTS IN ILLINOIS §
122 (1905).
50. Williams v. Spears, 235 Ala. 611, 180 So. 266 (1938) (subject to defensanco),
Bank of Statesboro v. Waters, 165 Ga. 848, 142 S.E. 156 (1928); Stombaugh v.
Morey, 388 Il. 392, 58 N.E.2d 545 (1944) (defeasible); Jonas v. Weires, 134 Iowa
47, 111 N.W. 453 (1907) (despite grossly inadequate price); Koelliker v. Denkinger,
148 Kan. 503, 83 P.2d 703 (1938) (not within spendthrift clause); Meade v. Rowe's
Ex'r & Trustee, 298 Ky. 111, 182 S.W.2d 30 (1944) (defeasible); Jones v. Jones, 344
Pa. 310, 25 A.2d 327 (1942) (equitable); Caples v. Ward, 107 Tex. 341, 179 S.W.
856 (1915) (defeasibly vested); Hurd v. Hughes, 12 Del. Ch. 188, 190, 109 Atl. 418,
418 (Ch. 1920) (dictum).
While the sacrifice and defeat of intent are likely to be just as great in the case
of a defeasible vested remainder, no case can be found holding such an estate com-
pletely immune from claims of creditors. In only two cases have these factors been
significantly recognized. Mears v. Lamona, 17 Wash. 148, 49 Pac. 251 (1897) (vested
remainder available to creditors, but sale postponed until possessory); Bank of States-
boro v. Waters, 165 Ga. 848, 142 S.E. 156 (1928) (equity, through which the interest
must be reached, could either order sale or preservation for creditors until end of life
tenancy).
51. Sackett v. Paine, 46 R.I. 439, 128 At]. 209 (1925); 1 FREUnIAN, ExEctrrioNs
§ 172a (2d ed. 1888). But this will not preclude enforcement of a security interest
based on consideration. See Hofmeister v. Hunter, 230 Wis. 81, 283 N.W. 330 (1939).
[Vol. 43:217
FUTURE INTERESTS
terest to immunize the estate from the claims of creditors."2 This
immunity obviously is not lost by the fact that the estate may be
in a sense "transferred" by release, by estoppel, or in equity, since
these methods are available for effecting transfers of all future in-
terests even though they are deemed inalienable. Because of the
generally accepted rule that rights of entry are inalienable, there is
little authority on whether such an estate would be subject to exe-
cution if alienable.53 Under the Restatement's position, a creditor
would not generally be able to reach a right of entry,54 but it seems
that if the estate were alienable under a local rule making contin-
gent remainders alienable, it would be as vulnerable to levy as
would be contingent remainders. Where possibilities of reverter are
freely transferable the decisions in point are split on the rights of
creditors to reach the interest.55 On the basis of the relatively fev
cases on this subject and the considerations involved, it can probably
be said again that on first impression a court will follow the policy
it has laid down for contingent remainders and executory interests.
Contingent remainder and executory interest cases are more abun-
dant, and some authority on the availability of such future interests
to satisfy creditors' claims can be found in nearly all jurisdictions.
Consequently these cases are particularly significant not only in
their own right but as indications of judicial attitudes on creditors'
rights against all conditional future estates which pass the initial
requirement of alienability. It has already been pointed out that,
under the authority which has developed, executory interests are
treated in the same manner as contingent remainders in matters of
voluntary and involuntary alienation. The wisdom of this similarity
of treatment rule is certainly questionable where the executory in-
terest is of the type presently created to commence in possession at
a fixed or determinable future time which is certain to arrive. Where
the estate created is to "spring" upon the death of the grantor or
after a stated number of years, for example, the executory interest
is, except for the fact that it is technically not vested, more nearly
akin to an indefeasibly vested remainder and should be so treated.
52. E.g., National Bank v. Bitter, 181 Ark. 439, 26 S.W.2d 113 (1930); Kenwood
Trust & Say. Bank v. Palmer, 285 1. 552, 121 N.E. 186 (1918); RES-rATrr N-T, Pno-
ERTY § 166 (1936). See also Chase v. Williams, 71 Me. 190, 195 (1880) (that statute
authorizing execution against all estates in remainder, reversion or otherwise merely
put execution on same footing as voluntary alienation).
53. Cf. Gushwa v. Gushwa, 93 Ind. App. 68, 177 N.E. 366 (1931) (called possibil-
ity of reverter).
54. RFSrATEMENT, PRoPERTY § 160, comment b (1936) provides that powers of
termination are inalienable, and § 166 provides that creditors can reach only freely
alienable interests.
55. See, e.g., Jensen v. Wilkinson, 133 S.W.2d 982 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939), 18 TXAS
L. REv. 344 (1940) (execution allowed); Gushwa v. Gushwa, 93 Ind. App. 68, 177
N.E. 366 (1931) (unavailable to creditors).
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If the executory interest is uncertain, it is then logical to apply the
rule for contingent remainders, whether that rule be one allowing
or disallowing execution. Thus the following discussion of contin-
gent remainders and executory interests should be read with the un-
derstanding that the executory interest cases encountered have
involved attempts to reach interests which were uncertain and simi-
lar to contingent remainders. It is here suggested that a court could
readily be persuaded that the rule, accurately stated, is that an
executory interest is treated like that type of remainder it most
nearly approximates. 5
Aside from the jurisdictions in which refusal to subject contin-
gent remainders and executory interests to execution is readily ex-
plainable on the basis of inalienability,"7 there is a second class of
at least a dozen states which, although holding some or all of such
interests freely alienable, refuse to allow creditors to reach any con-
tingent future interest.58 In a few states, courts or legislatures have
56. For a discussion of the similarity of the interests, both in treatment and In label-
ling, see Dukeminier, Contingent Remainders and Executory Interests: A Requiem for
the Distinction, 43 MnTN. L. REV. 13 (1958).
57. Since such interests are inalienable, see note 25 supra, they are all unavailable
to creditors on that basis in four states.
Arkansas: National Bank v. Ritter, 181 Ark. 439, 26 S.W.2d 113 (1930); Plumlec v.
Bounds, 118 Ark. 274, 176 S.W. 140 (1915) (execution sale not even cloud on contin-
gent remainderman's title); Love v. McDonald, 201 Ark. 882, 889, 148 S.W.2d 170,
174 (1941) (dictum).
Colorado: See Snyder v. O'Conner, 102 Colo. 567, 81 P.2d 773 (1938); Simes &
King, Transmissibility of Future Interests in Colorado, 27 Rocxiy MT. L. REv. 1 (1954).
Connecticut: Smith v. Gilbert, 71 Conn. 149, 41 At. 284 (1898) (adding that in-
terest "not appraisable").
Illinois: Kenwood Trust & Say. Bank v. Palmer, 285 IMI. 552, 121 N.E. 186 (1918);
Hull v. Adams, 399 Ill. 347, 357, 77 N.E.2d 706, 712 (1948) (dictum).
In addition there are other decisions holding remainders contingent as to person not
subject to execution on the basis of their inalienability. See note 59 infra.
58. These states are:
Alabama: ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 519 (1940) (limiting to vested future interests
in land); Wright v. Tuscaloosa, 236 Ala. 374, 182 So. 72 (1938).
California: Booge v. First Trust & Say. Bank, 64 Cal. App. 2d 532, 149 P.2d 32
(1944); Anglo Cal. Nat'l Bank v. Kidd, 58 Cal. App. 2d 651, 137 P.2d 460 (1943)
(equitable remainder contingent only as to event; sacrifice theory).
Georgia: Yancey v. Grafton, 197 Ga. 117, 27 S.E.2d 857 (1943) (contingent only
as to event, thus clearly transferable but held no execution). Regardless of the uncer-
tainty as to voluntary alienability where the contingency is as to person (supra note
30), this case makes it clear that all contingent remainders and executory interests are
immune from execution.
Iowa: Skelton v. Cross, 222 Iowa 262, 268 N.W. 499 (1936) (contingent as to event),
5 J.B.A. KAN. 269 (1937); Saunders v. Wilson, 207 Iowa 526, 220 N.W. 344 (1928)
(contingent as to person); accord, Jones v. Coon, 229 Iowa 756, 295 N.W. 162 (1940).
Taylor v. Taylor, 118 Iowa 407, 92 N.W. 71 (1902), had originally sought to differen-
tiate between contingencies as to person and event.
Maryland: Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Independent Brewing Ass'n, 127 Md. 463,
96 At. 617 (1916) (cannot reach remainder contingent as to event though clearly
alienable voluntarily; "incapable of appraisement"); Reilly v. Bristow, 105 Md. 320,
66 Ad. 262 (1907) (contingent as to person).
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decided that creditors can reach such interests if contingent only as
to event, but not if the person to take is undetermined.5' However,
this view has been rejected by many of the jurisdictions which, on
the question of voluntary alienation, distinguish between contin-
gencies as to person and event. In fact, at least half of the states
applying this distinction in determining transferability have denied
execution against all contingent future interests. 0 The other com-
monly adopted position, established in at least fourteen states, is
that because all of these estates are alienable they are subject to levy
and sale on execution.8' Quite commonly, decisions on this subject
New Jersey: Muller v. Cox, 98 N.J. Eq. 188, 130 AtL 811 (Ch. 1925) (contingent
as to event). Interests contingent as to event are transferable by statute, but the same
code provisions expressly add that this does not authorize levy and execution. N.J.
STAT. AN. tit. 46:3-7 (1940). But of. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Patzowsky, 131
N.J. Eq. 49, 23 A.2d 561 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942), setting aside transfer of such non-
leviable estate as a fraudulent conveyance.
North Carolina: Watson v. Dodd, 68 N.C. 528 (1873) (creditor's bill not reaching);
Bourne v. Farrar, 180 N.C. 135, 137, 104 S.E. 170, 172 (1920) (contingent as to event
held alienable, but dictum that not subject to sale for debts).
Ohio: Oto REV. CODE A_%,N. § 2329.01 (Page 1953) ("only vested estates"); Crum
v. Crum, 65 Ohio App. 431, 30 N.E.2d 448 (1940).
Oklahoma: Adams v. Dugan, 196 OkIa. 156, 163 P.2d 227 (1945) (equitable re-
mainder found contingent as to person; too speculative).
South Carolina: Albergotti v. Summers, 205 S.C. 179, 31 S.E.2d 129 (1944) (con-
tingent as to event); Home Bank v. Fox, 113 S.C. 378, 102 S.E. 643 (1920); Round-
tree v. Roundtree, 26 S.C. 450, 471, 2 S.E. 474, 481 (1887).
Tennessee: First Nat'l Bank v. Pointer, 174 Tenn. 472, 126 S.W.2d 335 (1939) (per-
sonalty); Nichols v. Guthrie, 109 Tenn. 535, 73 S.W. 107 (1902) (although alienable
if contingency is only as to event, execution would still be denied- dictum at 541, 73
S.W. at 109; holding involved contingency as to person).
Virginia: Howbert v. Cauthorn, 100 Va. 649, 42 S.E. 683 (1902) (too speculative);
Young v. Young, 89 Va. 675, 17 S.E. 470 (1893); cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-534 (1957)
permitting attachment of contingent remainders of nonresidents to get judgment and
lien but no sale until vesting.
59. This position has been adopted in Maine. An early statute still in effect provides
that creditors can levy upon and sell all the debtor's estate whether "in tail, reversion,
remainder, for life, years, or otherwise." 1E. REv. STAT. Aw. c. 171, § 8 (1954).
This was not intended to allow transfer in any new manner but was to put execution
on the same footing as voluntary conveyance. Chase v. Williams, 71 Me. 190, 195
(1880); of. Bangor v. Warren, 34 Me. 324 (1851). Voluntary transfer is precluded if
the future interest is contingent as to person. ME. REv. STAT. A-N. c. 168, § 3 (1954).
It is also believed that Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Vermont are in this class. See
note 62 infra. Massachusetts is, with some qualification, in this group too. See text at
notes 83-87 infra.
60. Compare notes 58 and 27 supra.
61. The following states are in this category:
Arizona: Am. REV. STAT. Arw. § -1558 (1956) (all nonexempt interests in prop-
erty, legal and equitable) together with §§ 33-204, 205 (existing interests defined to
include all future interests whether contingent as to person or event).
Idaho: InAnO CODE ANr. § 11-201 (1948) (all interests or rights in real and per-
sonal property), while § 55-106 clearly recognizes all contingent future estates as in-
terests in property.
Kansas: Jonas v. Jones, 153 Kan. 108, 109 P.2d 211 (1941); Thompson v. Zurich
State Bank, 124 Kan. 425, 260 Pac. 658 (1927) (equitable contingent remainder).
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within a judicial system do not lend themselves to satisfactory gen-
eralization of the rule being applied.12 Four states which have typi-
cally uncertain terms in their statutes have little else to provide
Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. § 426.190 (1958) expressly states that all contingent
future interests, vested or contingent, in land are subject to execution.
Michigan: MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.1581 (1938) (referring to all interests in realty,
legal or equitable, in possession, remainder, or reversion).
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. § 550.10 (1957) (encompassing all real and personal prop-
erty) together with §§ 500.8-.12.
Montana: MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 93-5810 (1947) (all interests real and per-
sonal; refer also to § 67-321, 327).
Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76-108 (1943) (explicit).
Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. § 21.080 (1957) (read with definitions in § 111.010); cf.
§ 111.230 on fraudulent conveyances.
New York: In re Weisbecker's Estate, 125 N.Y.S.2d 217 (Surr. Ct. 1953) (in trust);
National Bank Park v. Billings, 144 App. Div. 536, 129 N.Y. Supp. 846 (Sup. Ct.
1911), aff'd, 203 N.Y. 556, 96 N.E. 1122 (personal property via creditor's bill); accord,
Schaeffer v. Fisher, 137 Misc. 420, 242 N.Y. Supp. 308 (Sup. Ct. 1930) (release was
fraudulent conveyance). See N.Y. Crv. Pn~c. AcT § 913.
North Dakota: N.D. REV. CODE § 28-2108 (1943) (all interests in real and personal
property), in light of §§ 47-0215 to 0218, 0902.
Rhode Island: Wood v. Watson, 20 R.I. 223, 37 Atl. 1030 (1897).
West Virginia: See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3538 (1955); cf. Miller v. Miller, 127 W.
Va. 140, 31 S.E.2d 844 (1944) (holding turned on forfeiture clause in trust).
Wisconsin: Meyer v. Reif, 217 Wis. 11, 258 N.W. 391 (1935), 20 IOwA L. R v. 856.
62. In Delaware, Hurd v. Hughes, 12 Del. Ch. 188, 190, 109 Atl. 418, 418 (Ch.
1920), stated that "all possible titles to real estate, equitable, contingent or otherwise,
are subject to sale upon judgment and execution .. " Since voluntary transfer is
limited to interests in which the "person" is ascertained, it is most difficult to accept
literally what was pure dictum in this case. A proper interpretation would probably be
that execution has been placed on the same basis as transfer.
Indiana's position on contingent remainders is complicated by Gushwa v. Gushwu,
93 Ind. App. 68, 177 N.E. 366 (1931), holding there could be no fraudulent convey-
ance of what was called a possibility of reverter since it was too uncertain to be levied
upon and sold. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-3613 (Burns 1946), in effect at the time of the
aforementioned case, provideg for execution aganist reversions and remainders.
Mississippi has now apparently adopted the position that future interests are alien-
able unless contingent as to person. See note 27 supra. Mitchell v. Choctaw Bank, 107
Miss. 314, 65 So. 278 (1914), holding contingent remainders not subject to claims of
creditors, was decided on a then existing background of inalienability and is no longer
safe authority on rights of creditors.
In Missouri all contingent remainders and executory interests are probably leviable.
White v. McPheeters, 75 Mo. 286 (1882); Munday v. Austin, 358 Mo. 959, 969-70, 218
S.W.2d 624, 630 (1949) (dictum); Gordon v. Tate, 314 Mo. 508, 513, 284 S.W. 497.
498 (1926) (dictum). But see Anth v. Lehman, 144 S.W.2d 190 (Mo. App. 19,10)
often cited for proposition that such interests are unavailable to creditors in Mvlissouri.
Garnishment or imposition of a lien was denied in that case because the trust prop-
erty was not "due" the debtor, and his contingent right thereto was tied in with the
trustee's discretion to terminate the trust. This case seems not to correctly represent
the Missouri position on contingent remainders.
New Hampshire has no case in point since its 1953 decision permitting voluntary
transfer. See note 37 supra.
In Oregon, Jerman v. Nelson, 135 Ore. 126, 293 Pac. 592 (1932), has been cited as
permitting execution. See 21 OrnE. L. REV. 81 (1941). But, while the court talked of
execution sale and left the facts in doubt, the title involved was apparently based on
a mortgage foreclosure sale and thus the real issue was one of voluntary alienation. See
note 46 supra.
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aid for interpretation.' In Vermont a statute permits creditors to
reach all rights "in reversion and remainder," but because of de-
cisions on the subject of voluntary alienation, the local law may
not consider remainders contingent as to person to be existing rights
at all." A few states have special rules designed to meet the
unique problems presented by cases involving this type of property.
These rules can better be considered after a discussion of policy
factors which bear upon the solution of the problem.
Under the various rules which allow execution against future in-
terests, attachment is generally allowed to the same extent when
appropriate. 65 A statute in Virginia 6 expressly permits attachment
of contingent estates but prevents their sale on execution until the
time of vesting.67
Pennsylvania decisions are hard to reconcile. The stress placed on finding that a
remainder was vested in allowing execution in Jones v. Jones, 344 Pa. 310, 25 A.2d
327 (1942), infers a different result may have been required if contingent. Patterson
v. Caldwell, 124 Pa. 455, 17 AtL. 18 (1889), withheld from creditors a remainder con-
tingent as to persons, while Kenyon v. Davis, 219 Pa. 585, 69 At. 62 (1908) allowed
execution without considering the nature of the contingency. Dictum in Riverside
Trust Co. v. Twitchell, 42 Pa. 558, 563, 20 A.2d 768, 770-71 (1941), was that a con-
tingent remainder could not be attacled. One view of this position has suggested dif-
ferent rules for attachment and levy. Note, Tranismisbility of Future Interests in
Pennsylvania, 42 DicK. L. REv. 92 (1938). Drake v. Brown, 68 Pa. 223, 20 (1871),
states that all possible titles, vested or contingent, are leviable but preserves the con-
fusion by adding "provided there be a real interest in the defendant.'
In Texas, Caples v. Ward, 107 Tex. 341, 179 S.W. 856 (1915), infers contingent
remainders are not leviable in finding the interest in issue to be vested and subject to
execution, but possibilities of reverter are subject to levy. Jensen v. Willinson, 133
S.W.2d 982 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939), 18 Tmxxs L. REv. 344 (1940).
Washington cases are unclear and the outcome usually has turned on trust terms
and restraints. E.g., Milner v. Outcalt, 36 Wash. 2d 720, 219 P.2d 982 (1950); Knettle
v. Knettle, 164 Wash. 468, 3 P.2d 133 (1931). See also B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Thrash,
15 Wash. 2d 624, 131 P.2d 734 (1942). The inference seems to be that contingent re-
mainders are subject if not protected by an active trust. See text at note 127 infra on
Washington rule for interests in active trusts.
63. FL". STAT. § 55.20 (1957) and N.M. STAT. ArNN. § 24-1-2 (1953) (land, goods,
chattels, tenements); S.D. CoDE § 33.1911 (1939) and UTA R. Cnv. P. 69k (all in-
terests or estates).
64. Compare VT. R-v. STAT. § 2312 (1947), with note 27 supra on alienation. (See
the way in which Maine courts handled such a provision in view of its rule on voluntary
transfers, note 59 supra.)
65. E.g., Koelliker v. Denlinger, 148 Kan. 503, 83 P.2d 703 (1938), modified, 149
Kan. 259, 86 P.2d 740 (1939); Sanders v. Jones, 347 Mo. 255, 147 S.W.2d 424
(1941); Riverside Trust Co. v. Twitchell, 342 Pa. 558, 20 A.2d 768 (1941) (life
estate after life estate); Wood v. Watson, 20 R.L 2, 37 At. 1030 (1897). For
example of statute expressly so authorizing, see IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-3613 (Burns
1946).
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-534 (1957).
67. Also, a future interest which is available for the payment of creditors' claims
can be the subject matter of a fraudulent conveyance, White v. McPheeters, 75 Mo. 286
(1882) (equitable contingent remainder conveyed without consideration by insolvent);
Schaeffer v. Fischer, 137 Misc. 420, 242 N.Y. Supp. 308 (Sup. Ct. 1930) (release of
contingent remainder in trust). But if the interest is not subject to execution there is
a difference of opinion whether its transfer or release under certain conditions will
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Policy considerations versus technical rules
Two general considerations favor not permitting creditors to
reach future interests to satisfy their claims, even if the interests
are alienable: (1) the general policy which opposes frustration
of the donor, grantor, or testator's intent; 6S and (2) the general
opposition to the forced sale of property under speculative condi-
tions, at great sacrifice to the debtor and disproportionately small
return to the creditor2 If an estate in futuro is sold under these
conditions, and at a later date happens to "materialize" much of
the creditor's claim goes unsatisfied due to the small realization
on the sale of the property. The debtor has also been deprived
of that part of the value of the property which could have been ob-
tained if he had been allowed to retain the interest until it material-
ized, less the amount of the creditor's claim. The only party who
gains is the buyer of the property, whose windfall is actually a
reward for gambling.
On the other hand, it is somewhat harsh to deny a creditor ac-
cess to a property interest which his debtor can voluntarily transfer.
Further, assets are generally not exempt from execution merely
because they are not readily marketable. Apparently, there is
nothing inherent in a future interest which warrants preferred
treatment over other assets not having an in futuro nature." More-
over, unvested estates are generally viewed with disfavor because
of the complications they cause land titles and transactions.
These are the considerations upon which courts and legislatures
should decide whether the peculiarities of the contingent future
interests justify special immunity from creditors' claims. It is, how-
ever, because of these variously conflicting policies that uniformity
among the states cannot readily be achieved.
Most disturbing is the fact that the creditor's right against a future
estate is not always determined on the basis of these policies. In-
stead, the right often hinges on technical property rules which have
no logical bearing upon the particular problem, except insofar as
constitute a fraudulent conveyance. Gift of possibility of reverter by insolvent was not
a fraudulent conveyance in Gushwa v. Gushwa, 93 Ind. App. 68, 177 N.E. 366 (1931 ).
But see Equitable Life Assur. Co. v. Patzowsky, 131 N.J. Eq. 49, 23 A.2d 561 (Ch.
1942), which set aside as a fraudulent conveyance a transfer of an equitable remainder
contingent as to person, granting lien until interest should vest and become available
and modifying the lower court decision which had erroneously ordered execution.
Cf. 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 23.16 (Casner ed. 1952) on fraudulent transfers
resulting from exercise of otherwise nonleviable general powers of appointment.
68. See 1 AMmuCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.78 (Casner ed. 1952).
69. See attitude, typical of many courts, in Adams v. Dugan, 196 Okla. 150, 103
P.2d 227 (1945), and Mears v. Lamona, 17 Wash. 148, 49 Pac. 251 (1897).
70. E.g., SLMES, FuTuRE INTERESTS § 37 (1951). See also RESTATEMENT, PROPEIITY
§ 166 (1936).
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they determine the interest held. In the jurisdictions where a con-
tingent remainder is not subject to levy, the importance of the same
condition being subsequent rather than precedent is obvious, since a
defeasibly vested remainder is always subject to execution."1 But al-
though the intent of the grantor and the uncertainties and marketa-
bility of two interests may be identical, the sometimes fortuitous se-
lection of different words of limitation or purchase could result in dif-
ferent outcomes. Hence, an almost valueless defeasibly vested estate
in a particular tract of land may be sold on execution, while another
estate in the same property would in many states be withheld from
creditors because subject to a condition precedent. 2 Similarly, if
a conveyance leaves in the grantor a reversionary interest of a type
which would be a contingent remainder if created in a third party,
it is by definition a vested estate and therefore subject to execution
everywhere. Some justification for this may be found on the basis
of the same theory which militates against a person creating an
effective spendthrift trust for himself,73 but the reversionary inter-
est is significantly different in principle.7 4 Furthermore, once an
interest has come into existence as a reversion it retains this label,
with all its attributes, even though it is thereafter conveyed to an-
other.75 For all practical respects the estate is then identical to a
remainder originally created in the grantee, yet it remains a rever-
sion and would be subject to execution even if, under the law of
the jurisdiction involved, its equivalent in remainder would not be.
This is not an argument against forced sales of reversions but one
71. Compare note 50 with notes 57-59 supra.
72. Such a situation could be illustrated by a devise "to X for life, remainder
to Y and his heirs, but if Y should predecease X, then to Z and his heirs." Assume Y
and Z are brothers of the testator, and X is testators wife. Depending on the age and
health of the parties, Z's estate may have a greater actuarial value than Y's; yet as a
result of form Z's estate is an executory interest while Y's would be defensibly vested
under typical rules of construction. On classification of such interests see 1 A.Nmucm
LAw oF PIopEnTy § 4.7 (Casner ed. 1952) (above illustration discussed therein at
473). Under a minority veiw, Y and Z would have alternative contingent remainders,
which for the purpose of creditors rights would lead to the preferable result of identical
treatment.
73. RESTAaMnT, TRuSTs § 156 (1935).
74. In the spendthrift trust the settlor has reserved the present benefits of his
property while attempting to evade liability. He has not really parted with the enjoy-
ment of the property. Policy cannot allow him virtually to retain his property and, by
a mere change of form, to place it beyond the reach of his creditors. The reversioner
whose interest is defeasible has merely a chance of the property's return but has
presently given up its benefits. The spendthrift trust would, in absence of this rule,
invite abuse by persons properly situated. The retention of a defeasible reversion
would not be susceptible of such abuse, except in those cases which would be remedi-
able anyway as fraudulent conveyances. The rule as to levy on reversionary interests
should be predicated on the same policy considerations as the rule for remainders, and
any analogy to spendthrift trusts should be rejected.
75. See 1 Sams & SMrr, FuTuRtE INTrnrs § 82 (2d ed. 1956).
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in favor of applying the same rules to reversions and remainders,
whether dependent on conditions precedent or subsequent. Vested-
ness is not necessarily an indication of value or salability.7"
There is also no validity in differentiating between contingencies
as to persons and events. The latter may well be less predictable,
or the interests may be practical equivalents. Since the elements of
uncertainty and sacrifice are the crux of the problem, the test for
determining whether the interests are subject to creditors' claims
should be expressed in such terms. Distinctions strictly in terms of
vested or contingent and in terms of contingencies as to person or
event are not only unrealistic in this area, but create serious prob-
lems of construction.77 They also enable and may even encotuage
courts to manipulate the rights of litigants by tenuous, if not errone-
ous, classifications of the estate in issue.78
76. Two examples well illustrate the fallacy of paying homage to vestedness. One
of the most speculative and least valuable of future estates imaginable is likely to be
the remainder for life following a present life estate, but creditors can clearly reach
such an estate since a life estate in remainder with possession conditioned, as it must
be, upon surviving the present life tenant is always technically a vested remainder. See
Bogenrief v. Law, 222 Iowa 1303, 271 N.W. 229 (1937), where such an estate was
reached by creditors. On the other hand, in Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Patzowsky,
131 N.J. Eq. 49, 23 A.2d 561 (Ct. Err. & App. 1942), a valuable contingent remainder
could not be sold on execution by a creditor of the remainderman, whose right to each
of three property interests was contingent only upon the life tenant thereof (lying
without issue. Each life tenant was in her late fifties, childless, and either widowed or
unmarried; thus the vesting of the estates would probably be a mere matter of time.
See also Young v. Tudor, 323 Mass. 508, 511, 83 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1948), recognizing
that contingent interests may be worth more than vested.
77. A commonly cited example of such difficulties is Kahn v. Rockhill, 132 N.J. Eq.
188, 28 A.2d 34 (Ch. 1942), finally deciding that a remainder to go to the surviving
children of the life tenant was contingent as to persons, hence inalienable and did not
pass to the trustee in bankruptcy of one of the children. See also difficulty in finding of
vested estate in Greer v. Parker, 209 Ark. 553, 191 S.W.2d 584 (1946).
The contingent as to person or event distinction has an "interesting" history of uncer-
tainty in Maryland. In re Banks' Will, 87 Md. 425,40 Atl. 268 (1898), held a remainder
contingent as to person not alienable. Then Reilly v. Mackenzie, 151 Md. 216, 134 Atl.
502 (1926), held estates alienable where contingency was as to event by finding person
ascertained when remainder was to surviving children (contrary to result in Kahn v.
Rockhill, supra). A federal district court then held, under the doubtful construction
and result in the Reilly case, that the effect of that case was to render a remainder
contingent as to person alienable. In re Moore, 22 F.2d 432 (D. Md. 1927). Suskin &
Berry v. Rumley, 37 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1930), restored the distinction in federal
courts in Maryland. The question was evaded in Hans v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 178
Md. 52, 12 A.2d 208 (1940), by "finding" a condition to be subsequent when probably
it should have been precedent, which would have made the estate contingent as to
person. An analysis of the Maryland law criticized the distinction between contin-
gencies as to person and event, finding in these cases hope for a change. Reno, Alion-
ability and Transmissibility of Future Interests in Maryland, 2 MD. L. REv. 89 (1938).
However, the distinction has now been firmly reasserted in In re Clayton's Estate, 195
Md. 622, 74 A.2d 1 (1950), referring to Professor Reno's criticism and stating that the
applicability and validity of the distinction is beyond question.
78. See, e.g., Adams v. Dugan, 196 Okla. 156, 163 P.2d 227 (1945) (holding con-
tingent; dissent view, that condition was subsequent, more common); Luttgen v.
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With the exception of powers of termination, the Restatement of
Property has adopted the position that all future interests, vested or
contingent, in all types of property, are transferable and therefore
subject to execution. 9 One exception is provided: Where the inter-
est is held in trust and is too speculative to be fairly appraised it
may not be presently sold."' This exception is made only in defer-
ence to the Restatement of Trusts, which adopted that position."
It can safely be said that there was no actual intent to recommend
different treatment for legal and equitable future interests, but this
was merely a convenient, formal compromise. s2 The American Law
Institute's position is, of course, acceptable only where all future
interests are fully alienable voluntarily in accordance with the Re-
statement's view on that point.
A sound solution to the problem, theoretically at least, is sug-
gested by that adopted in Massachusetts. The approach is similar
to that taken by the Restatement of Trusts. By statute, remainders
and reversions, legal and equitable, may be reached to satisfy a
judgment, 3 except that supplementary procedures may not be
utilized against an interest which is so speculative that its value can-
not be fairly ascertained by any means.8 4 The application of this
provision is ideally illustrated by the case of Clarke v. Fay,"' in
which the court was confronted with two contingent remainders in
trust. It was held that one interest could be reached by a creditors'
bill and that the other could not because of different degrees of
contingency. One interest involved a simple contingency requiring
the debtor to survive his father, the life tenant, and this interest
could be readily appraised actuarially. The other involved a gift over
to the debtor in the event any of his aunts, also life tenants, outlived
the debtor's father and then such aunt died without issue. The
court decided that the latter interest was so complicated that any
Tiffany, 87 R.L 416, 93 At. 182 (1915) (held contingent and unav'ailable); Home
Bank v. Fox, 113 S.C. 378, 102 S.E. 648 (1920) (avoiding execution by finding of
contingent where it appeared that dissent was better supported by authority in urging
vested subject to divestment). Compare Reilly v. Mackenzie (allowing passage to
bankruptey trustee), with Kahn v. Rockhill (not to trustee in bankruptcy), both note
77 supra, differently labeling like estates.
In 2 Powzm., REA. PROPERTY 286 (1950), recognizing the possible difficulty in
determining whether an interest is vested, it is said that a preference for vestedness
remains in jurisdictions where contingent estates are not subject to execution. This
generalization seems not to be borne out by the cases involving creditors' rights.
79. REsrATEimNT, PRoPERTY §§ 159-63, 166 (1936).
80. RESTATEiENT, PRoPa-ry § 166(2) (b) (1936).
81. RzrATEmT,, TRUSTS § 162 (1935).
82. See RFSTATE-MNT, PROPERTY § 166, comment c (1936).
83. MAss. ANN. Laws c. 236, § 1 (1956).
84. MAss. AwN. LAws c. 214,§ 3(7) (1955).
85. 205 Mass. 228, 91 N.E. 328 (1910).
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evaluation would be too speculative."' There are probably two short-
comings in the Massachusetts law, however. First, voluntary aliena-
bility is limited to those estates in which the contingency is not as
to person.17 Secondly, the statutory exception for estates which can-
not be fairly appraised may not apply to all contingent future inter-
ests. This is a result of the wording of the statute which makes it
applicable only where the estate cannot be reached by normal pro-
cedures. The basic execution provision refers generally to remainders
and reversions, and Clarke v. Fay involved only contingent estates in
trust. Consequently it is not clear in all cases when supplemental
procedures must be used so as to invoke the discretion of the court,
rather than the usual methods of enforcing a judgment.
A somewhat more recent Wisconsin case sugigests an interesting
alternative judicial solution.88 The debtor's equitable contingent re-
mainder could entitle him at age twenty-five to receive the principal
and any accumulated income of a trust. The court held that the in-
terest, being alienable, could be reached by a creditor but recom-
mended that the court below grant the creditor a lien on the estate
and postpone sale until its vesting.
In a few states results like that provided by the Massachusetts
statute or that suggested by the Wisconsin court might be reached
by proceedings in equity. Where such interests are available to
creditors only through courts of equity, the court could postpone
sale or otherwise exercise its broad powers to fashion appropriate
remedies which protect the interests of the debtor, the creditors, and
the purchaser." Wherever statutes provide for court supervision
of execution sales, this power should be used as a means of assuring
a fair price.
86. The court also decided that this interest was contingent as to person. It was thus
inalienable and did not pass to the trustee in bankruptcy. (If the listed events occurred
the property would pass to the bankrupt, and, despite the complexity of the interest,
it seems the debtor's interest should have been held to be contingent only as to events.)
The less complicated remainder had already been validly sold on execution and, for
that reason, also did not pass to the trustee.
87. MAss. ANN. LAws c. 184, § 2 (1955). See execution of "vested interest in con-
tingent remainder" where contingency was as to event in Cashman v. Bangs, 200 Mass.
498, 86 N.E. 932 (1909), and Alexander v. MePeck, 189 Mass. 34, 75 N.E. 88 (1905).
The rationale of the cases infers contingency as to person would preclude execution.
See also Young v. Tudor, 323 Mass. 508, 511, 83 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1948) (dictum).
Seemingly inability to evaluate for purpose of execution has thus been generally equated
with the alienability standard, but probably also leaves open the possibility of protect-
ing a precarious transferable interest.
88. Meyer v. Reif, 217 Wis. 11, 258 N.W. 891 (1935), 20 IOWA L. REv. 850.
89. See Bank of Stateboro v. Waters, 165 Ga. 848, 142 S.E. 156 (1928) (also that
creditors' bill in equity is proper means of reaching such interest); Mears v. Lamona,
17 Wash. 148, 49 Pac. 251 (1897); Meyer v. Reif, 217 Wis. 11,258 N.W. 391 (1935).
But cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-534 (1957) (a not unusual provision precluding sale of
realty if payment can be obtained from rents and profits within a certain period) af-
fording no protection for future interests because of their nonpossessory nature.
[Vol. 43:217
FUTURE INTERESTS
While the variety of possible contingencies renders it impractical,
if not undesirable, to prescribe a rigid test to determine when con-
tingent future interests should be sold, any general rule should
allow execution in the absence of extenuating circumstances. In
considering whether sale should be denied or postponed and a
lien granted, the court should not only consider the degree of un-
certainty, but also the relation of possible price to actuarial value,
probable delay in vesting, and special opportunities for an advan-
tageous sale. Although it is suggested that denial of execution should
be reserved for exceptional cases, the precise line to be drawn would
vary from one jurisdiction to another depending on state policy.
The variables are so many that the details of the policy could prob-
ably be best formulated judicially. To be completely acceptable the
rule providing this flexibility should encompass all conditional es-
tates whether the contingency be precedent or subsequent and
whether the estate be in reversion or remainder. Obviously such a
solution requires recognition of free alienability for all future
interests.
In decedents estates
Where the future interest in question is part of a decedents es-
tate, the rights of estate creditors appear generally to be deter-
mined as they would be inter vivosY0 Because of the limited num-
ber of cases in point, neither a definite or detailed statement of the
law can be made. The mere fact that the interest is devisable,
though not generally alienable, ought not to subject the interest to
claims of creditors of the estate." If upon the debtor's death the
interest vests or satisfies the local requirement for execution, it
would seem to be available to creditors who properly file their
claims with the decedent's representative.92 Any change in the
character of the interest thereafter should be deemed immaterial.
Otherwise creditors' rights might be dependent on or even manipu-
lated by the period of administration.
In a few jurisdictions at least, there is some basis for believing that
the rights of creditors may be greater after the debtors death.
Several states which deny execution against contingent future in-
interests alienable inter vivos have authority which supports the
proposition that creditors of the estate may reach whatever the
decedent-debtor could have transferred while alive.9 3 Whether the
90. See Melton v. Camp, 121 Ga. 693, 49 S.E. 690 (1905); Clark v. Hillis, 134
Ind. 421, 34 N.E. 13 (1893); Bergmann v. Lord, 194 N.Y. 70, 86 N.E. 828 (1909).
91. See 4 SiExs & Szrrr, FuTrm INTERm- § 1926 (2d ed. 1956).
92. This is the position of the REsTAT FN-r, PaoPEnA-x- § 169(2) (b) (1936).
93. E-g., a statute employing such language is found in Omo RE,. Con § 2127.07
(Page 1953) (without specific reference to future interests), and the rationale of the
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intent of the rule is actually to equate the rights of a creditor with
the debtor's power of alienation is uncertain but plausible. A rule
so extending the rights of a decedent's creditors could be justified
on the reasoning that, if creditors are at this time denied access to
the property, they can not await its vesting as they could during
the debtor's lifetime.
III. FuTuRE INTERESTS UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
Section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act confers certain additional
rights upon creditors, while preserving their rights under state law."'
As a result the trustee in bankruptcy is vested with the bankrupt's
title in all future interests which are subject to the claims of credi-
tors under applicable state law." In addition the trustee receives
all property interests of the bankrupt which he (the bankrupt)
could "by any means" have transferred prior to the filing of the
petition," plus certain interests in real property which become as-
signable within six months thereafterY7 Thus it is clear that all
future interests which are freely alienable under state law at the
time specified for the type of property involved, will pass to the
bankruptcy trustee, even if immune from execution."' More specifi-
cally, the trustee receives all reversions and vested remainders re-
decision in Melton v. Camp, 121 Ga. 693, 49 S.E. 690 (1905), was in these terms,
although the result could have been based on inter vivos availability to creditors since
the estate was vested.
94. Bankruptcy Act § 70a(5), 30 Stat. 565 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (1952).
95. E.g., Tuffy v. Nichols, 120 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 660
(1941); Vellacott v. Murphy, 16 F.2d 700 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 767 ( 1927);
In re Dorgan's Estate, 237 Fed. 507 (S.D. Iowa 1916); Kost v. Foster, 406 I11. 565, 94
N.E.2d 302 (1950); cf. Watkins v. Bigelow, 93 Minn. 361, 101 N.W. 497 (1904).
96. Bankruptcy Act § 70a(5), 30 Stat. 566 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (1952).
97. Bankruptcy Act § 70a(7), 30 Stat. 566, as amended, 11 U.S.C. at § 110(a)(7)
(1952). See discussion in 1948 Supplement to the RESTATEMENT, PRoPnRTy § 168.
See also COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL § 70.23 (2d ed. 1954).
Prior to 1938, the trustee's right to all property was determined at the time of bank-
ruptcy, and the vesting of real property thereafter would not have benefited creditors.
See In re Baker, 13 F.2d 707 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 733 (1926), 27 CoLUMt.
L. REv. 87 (1927), 36 YALE L.J. 272 (1926), involving expectancies. The rule as to
personalty remains unchanged. See this rule in In re Wetmore, 108 Fed. 520 (3d Cir.
1901).
98. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 4.80 (Casner ed. 1952); 4 COLLItER, BANK-
RUPTCY f 70.37 (14th ed. 1942); MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY § 178 (1956); 2 POWELL,
REAL PROPERTY IT 287 (1950); 3 REMINCTON, BANKRUPTCY §§ 1219.01-.04 (4th ed.
1941); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 168 (1936); 2 SCOTr, TRUSTS § 147.1 (2d ed.
1956); 4 SnMES & SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 1927 (2d ed. 1956).
The following are a few of the examples of cases holding contingent remainders
pass to bankruptcy trustee because alienable voluntarily although clearly not subject
to creditors' claims under state law: In re Moore, 22 F.2d 432 (D. Md. 1927); Noonan
v. State Bank, 211 Iowa 401, 233 N.W. 487 (1930); Reilly v. Mackenzie, 151 Md.
216, 134 Atl. 502 (1926), 13 VA. L. REv. 131. See also Bock v. Whelan, 30 S.W.2d
607 (Mo. App. 1930), passing since alienable where creditors' rights under state law
unclear.
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gardless of conditions subsequent.9 Contingent remainders, execu-
tory interests and possibilities of reverter will also pass in most
states, especially if contingent only as to event, depending on the
law of future interests of the state where the property is situated.100
Occasionally the trustee will receive a power of termination." The
effect of this bankruptcy rule on freely alienable future interests is
beyond doubt: the title to these interests vests in the trustee. Special
difficulty has arisen, however, where the estate is not freely alien-
able. As has already been pointed out, inalienable future interests
are everywhere recognized to have limited alienability by release,
by estoppel and in equity.102 As a result, the problem centers around
the meaning of the unfortunate expression "by any means." Does
the Bankruptcy Act require free alienability or is it satisfied by
limited alienability? The problem can arise in connection with
contingent future estates only where there is contact with one of
the approximately fifteen jurisdictions denying full alienability, but
the cases are in disagreement.
The predominant view is that only estates which are freely alien-
able pass to the bankruptcy trustee.' However, the Court of Ap-
99. E.g., Tuffy v. Nichols, 120 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 660
(1941); In re Smith, 71 F.2d 378 (9th Cir. 1934); Vellacott v. Murphy, 16 F.2d 700
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 767 (1927); Hodam v. Jordan, 82 F. Supp. 183 (E.D.
Ill. 1949); In re Dorgan's Estate, 237 Fed. 507 (S.D. Iowa 1916); In re Twaddell, 110
Fed. 145 (D. Del. 1901) (subject to open); Cooper v. Davis, 174 Ca. 670, 163 S.E.
736 (1932) (what court called "contingent reverter"); Forbes v. Snow, 239 Mass.
138, 131 N.E. 299 (1921); Manhattan Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Bedford, 161 Tenn.
187, 30 S.W.2d 227 (1930); cf. In re Bryson, 49 F.2d 408 (N.D. Tex. 1931); Bostian
v. Milens, 239 Mo. App. 555, 198 SAV.2d 797 (1946).
100. E.g., Hammond v. Whittredge, 204 U.S. 538 (1907) (contingent as to event
thus alienable in Massachusetts; property in trust); Rountree v. Lane, 155 F.2d 471
(4th Cir. 1946); Horton v. Moore, 110 F.2d 189 (6th Cir.) (in trust), cert. denlied, 311
U.S. 692 (1940); In re Moore, 22 F.2d 432 (D. Md. 1927); Estate of Aldrich, 35 Cal.
2d 20, 215 P.2d 724 (1950); Noonan v. State Bank, 211 Iowa 401, 233 N.W. 487
(1930); Reilly v. Mackenzie, 151 Md. 216, 134 At 502 (1926), 13 Vt. L. RE,. 131;
Bock v. Whelan, 30 S.W.2d 607 (Mo. App. 1930); Clowe v. Seavey, 208 N.Y. 496, 102
N.E. 521 (1913); Matter of Brand, 156 Misc. 312, 281 N.Y. Supp. 548 (Sup.Ct. 1935);
Cunningham's Estate, 340 Pa. 265, 16 A.2d 712 (1940); Packer's Estate, 246 Pa.
116, 92 At] 70 (1914) (executory interest; uncertainty as to event); cf. In re Brown,
60 F.2d 269 (W.D. Ky. 1932) (joint tenancy); Estep v. Estep, 237 S.W.2d 647 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1951). See also Miller v. Miller, 127 W. Va. 140, 31 S.E.2d 844 (1944).
Inalienability, which should have the effect of preventing passage to the bankruptcy
trustee, is the rule for all contingent future estates in Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut
(except possibilities of reverter), and Illinois (but see discussion of Landis rule for
Illinois on passage of "inalienable" estates in bankruptcy, text at note 104 infra). See
note 25 supra. In addition, note 27 supra indicates that in at least eleven states inalien-
ability will only preclude the trustee from reaching those future interests which are
contingent as to person.
101. The rare alienability of this estate is discussed supra note 18.
102. See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
103. E.g., In re Martin, 47 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1931); Suskin & Berry v. Rumley,
37 F.2d 304, (4th Cir. 1930); In re Wetmore, 108 Fed. 520 (3d Cir. 1901) (contin-
gent as to person); In re Twaddel, 110 Fed. 145, 147 (D. Del. 1901) (dictum ex-
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peals for the Seventh Circuit, in In re Landis,10 4 interpreted the
statutory language literally and held that a contingent remainder,
clearly inalienable under Illinois law, was transferable "by any
means" under section 70a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act since it could
be assigned in equity for value. Under this view, all that is necessary
is that there be some method of transfer rather than general trans-
ferability. The Landis interpretation appears to be accepted today
only in the Seventh Circuit, and its history there is unique. After
the Landis decision, the Illinois Supreme Court was on several oc-
casions confronted with the same question and reached the oppo-
site result, holding the estates did not pass to the trustee.'0 ' A
federal district court in Illinois then held that an inalienable future
interest did pass to the trustee in bankruptcy.00 Since the interven-
ing state court decisions had not changed the Illinois rule on volun-
tary transfer, the district court correctly concluded that it was bound
by the decision of the court of appeals and reluctantly, it seems,
followed Landis. The characteristics of alienability of an estate are
governed by state law. However, the interpretation of the Bank-
ruptcy Act and the significance of the limited alienability in Illinois
are federal questions. ° The result is that the Landis rule is in effect
only in the Seventh Circuit, and even there only in the federal
courts.' 8
The rule in the Landis case cannot be justified under the present
law. The methods of alienation relied on to satisfy the statute are
not really "transfers," by the generally accepted meaning of that
term. The owner's conduct may result in estoppel or in an equitable
"contract to convey," in either case to be later enforced against
pressly rejecting position later taken by Landis case, infra note 104); In re Ehle, 109
Fed. 625 (D. Vt. 1901); In re Hoadley, 101 Fed. 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1900) (contingent as
to person; at that time inalienable); Johnston v. Herrin, 383 Ill. 598, 50 N.E.2d 720
(1943); Clarke v. Fay, 205 Mass. 228, 91 N.E. 328 (1910) (contingent as to person);
Kahn v. Rockhil, 132 N.J. Eq. 188, 28 A.2d 34 (Cb. 1942) (contingent as to person).
See also Peck v. Chatfield, 24 Ohio App. 176, 156 N.E. 459 (1927), and Luttgen v.
Tiffany, 37 R.I. 416, 93 Atl. 182 (1915), so holding before such estates became
alienable.
104. 41 F.2d 700 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Farmers' Bank v. Bickenbach,
282 U.S. 872 (1930), 25 ILL. L. RELv. 555 (1931).
105. Johnston v. Herrin, 383 Ill. 598, 50 N.E.2d 720 (1943); Riddle v. Killian, 360
Ill. 294, 8 N.E.2d 629 (1937).
106. In re Reifsteck, 71 F. Supp. 157 (E.D. Ill. 1947), 43 ILL. L. REv. 121 (1948),
26 TEXAS L. REv. 526.
107. 71 F. Supp. at 158-59; Albert Pick & Co. v. Wilson, 19 F.2d 18 (8th Cir. 1927);
of. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940) (state law determined interest
created, but effect thereof under tax statute is federal question); Elliot v. Wheelock,
34 F.2d 213 (W.D. Mo. 1929). See 4 COLLIFa, BANKRUPTCY § 70.37 (14th ed. 1942).
108. It has been said that In re Moore, 22 F.2d 432 (D.C. Md. 1927), also lind
adopted this position, but the error of this case was its misinterpretation of state law
on alienability (see note 77 supra). Whatever the basis of the holding in this case, it has
been overruled by Suskin & Berry v. Rumley, 37 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1930).
FUTURE INTERESTS
him, or in a release extinguishing his right To hold that these are
transfers within the meaning of the present act seems questionable.
If this appears to be only a semantic hurdle, there are more per-
suasive reasons for rejecting the Landis position. It cannot seriously
be contended that a bare expectancy, such as a child has in the
property of a living parent, would, under the "by any means" rule,
pass in bankruptcy for the benefit of creditors. 109 Such an expectancy
can, however, be "assigned in equity" for a consideration in the
same manner as an inalienable future interest.10 The doctrine of
estoppel by deed also applies to expectancies."' Under the view of
jurisdictions denying alienability, a contingent future estate is la-
beled a mere expectancy. Furthermore, the legislative intent can be
found by looking to section 70a(7) of the Bankruptcy Act, which
provides that the trustee gets title to "contingent remainders, execu-
tory devises and limitations, rights of entry for condition broken,
rights or possibilities of reverter, and like interests in real property,
which were nonassignable prior to bankruptcy and which, within six
months thereafter, become assignable .... " This implies the exist-
ence of estates which are not transferable "by any means" under
section 70a(5). Since all the above listed estates have limited aliena-
bility by estoppel and in equity, even in Illinois,"' and since there
must have been some purpose for this provision for future estates,
the conclusion is inevitable that for so long as they are not generally
alienable they are to be withheld from creditors in bankruptcy. (In
fairness to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, it should
109. See In re Baker, 13 F.2d 707 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 733 (1926);
In re Lage, 19 F.2d 153 (N.D. Iowa 1927); 4 CoLfin, BA,-nuptrcy § 70.37 (14th ed.
1942); McLAcHrAN, BAmKRupTCY § 178 (1956); 3 RnmnqcToNr, BANmRUPTcY § 1219.05
(4th ed. 1941).
In re Baker, supra, involved a rather interesting problem, the principle of which is
also applicable to the subject of inalienable future interests. The holding of that case
was that the bankruptcy trustee for the assignee (for consideration) of an expectancy
was not entitled to the bankrupt's contractual right in that expectancy. This result has
been frequently criticized on the basis that the bankrupt had an equitably enforceable
contract which he could transfer, satisfying the express language of section 70a. E.g.,
1 AMERCAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 4.80 (Casner ed. 1952); RESTATEmrnT, PoPmrrTy §
168, comment f (1936), § 317(2) (Supp. 1940); 4 Smrss & S.rri, F uTURE InEEsTS§ 1927 (2d ed. 1956) (discussing it in connection with bankruptcy of "assignee" of
inalienable future interest). While it is conceded that such criticisms are analytically
sound, the case seems to reach a desirable result. Where the "acquisition" of an inalien-
able future interest or expectancy is a fraud on creditors, the proper solution is to treat
such purchase as a fraudulent conveyance and set it aside; but it is difficult to imagine
a forced attempt to sell a mere hope solely because it had been previously "assigned
voluntarily."
110. See ATKIsoN, WNV=s § 131 (2d ed. 1953); 4 Cornth, Co.n-rRAc-s § 735
(1951).
111. 4 CoRniN, Corn-=AcTs § 735 (1951); 1 PATro, TrrLxs §§ 213, 215-17 (2d ed.
1957).
112. See Kohl v. Montgomery, 373 Ill. 200, 25 N.E.2d 826 (1940); Carey & Free-
man, Alienation of Future Interests in Illinois, 31 ILL. L. Rm,. 1 (1936).
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be pointed out that section 70a(7) was enacted eight years after
the decision in the Landis case.) These conclusions do not neces-
sarily mean that the Landis view would be bad policy if enacted,
but merely that it represents an erroneous application of the pres-
ent statute. In support of a statutory change along the lines of the
Landis decision, it can be said that the owner of an inalienable future
interest can, as a practical matter, beneficially deal with the prop-
erty as if it were alienable.
The Bankruptcy Act has at least expanded the rights of creditors
since the trustee receives all interests which are transferable inter
vivos regardless of state prohibitions against involuntary alienation.
The results are still dependent upon confusing state property law
governing voluntary alienation,'113 and this as been the main
source of litigation. Occasionally this has caused a carryover into
bankruptcy proceedings of archaic local distinctions between con-
ditions precedent and subsequent or between contingencies as to
person and event.
IV. FuTuRuE INTERESTS IN TRUST
The rights of creditors in future interests are the same whether
the estate involved is legal or equitable, 1 4 except as a different
treatment might result from factors other than the in futuro char-
acter of the interest.11 It is not the purpose of this article to con-
sider in full the rights of creditors of trust beneficiaries,"' but it is
necessary to treat this subject in so far as it relates to problems pe-
culiar to or complicated by the involvement of future interests.
While direct restraints on alienation of legal interests are gener-
ally invalid," 7 they are commonly permissible in the case of interests
113. Because of the resultant confusion, it is unlikely that failure to schedule a
complicated future interest will infer such bad faith as to constitute a ground for
denial of discharge. See In re McCrea, 161 Fed. 246 (2d Cir. 1908); Woods v. Little,
134 Fed. 229 (3d Cir. 1905). But cf. In re Bryson, 49 F.2d 408 (N.D. Tex. 1931)
(where bad faith apparent).
114. See, e.g., Thompson v. Zurich State Bank, 124 Kan. 425, 260 Pac. 658 ( 1927);
Matter of Brand, 156 Misc. 312, 281 N.Y. Supp. 548 (Sup. Ct. 1935); 2 ScoTr, Tnus'rs
§ 162 (2d ed. 1956); RESTATEMENT, TRusTs § 162 (1935). That equity generally
treats equitable interests as law treats legal interests, see 2 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 132 (2d
ed. 1956). However, the procedures commonly differ, RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 147
(1935), and cases reaching a result contrary to that for a comparable legal estate
generally turn on selection of the wrong remedy. E.g., Noyes v. Noyes, 110 Vt. 511, 9
A.2d 123 (1939) (execution denied where creditor's bill required).
115. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 127 W. Va. 140, 31 S.E.2d 844 (1944); Milner v.
Outcalt, 36 Wash. 2d 720, 219 P.2d 982 (1950); RESTATEIMENT, PRoPERTY § 166,
comment e (1936).
116. Discussions of this subject are found in 1A BOCERT, TRUSTS & TIUSTLLS § 193
(1951); 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 70.26 (14th ed. 1942); 2 Scott, Trusts § 147 (2d
ed. 1956).
117. CRAY, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION § 113 (2d ed. 1895); RESTATEMENT, PRoP-
ERTY § 405 (1944); SIMiEs, FUTURE INTERESTS §§ 101-04 (1951).
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in trust.""8 Most states today hold that spendthrift, discretionary, or
like provisions are effective to prevent irrevocable assignment and
involuntary transfer of a beneficiary's right to receive income.' The
validity of such a provision in a trust instrument is not so clear if
applied to a future interest. The weight of authority among these
states would also probably allow restraint upon alienation of a fu-
ture right to the principal of a trust, 120 but in several jurisdictions
otherwise recognizing such provisions it has been held that they are
invalid when applied to principal.' 12 However, restriction would be
valid even where it is likely to be held that the spendthrift clause
or discretion was not "intended" to apply to the remainder in trust.' -2
Since a trustee receives only such title as is necessary for him to
carry out his actual duties, it might also be held that the future
interest is, in reality, a legal estate outside the scope of the trust.=3
If the trust is passive, involves land, and is situated in a jurisdiction
in which the Statute of Uses is still operative, the future interest
would be converted to a legal estate, invalidating any direct restraint
on alienation.12 4 The result would expose the estate to creditors'
claims. 2 ' Commonly then, even though a generally valid restraint
118. RESTATMMNT, TRUSTS § 152 (1935).
119. BocEnT, TRUSTS §§ 40-44 (3d ed. 1952); GrusWoLD, Spmr,,Mmur TnusTs §
53-79 (2d ed. 1947); 2 Sco-r, TRUSTS § 152 (2d ed. 1956).
120. E.g., Coughran v. First Nat'l Bank, 19 Cal. App. 2d 152, 64 P.2d 1013 (1937);
Ober v. Dodge, 210 Iowa 643, 231 N.W. 444 (1930); Richardson v. Warfield, 252
Mass. 518, 148 N.E. 141 (1925); Gordon v. Tate, 314 Mo. 508, 284 S.W. 497 (1926)
(contingent remainder); Alderman v. Virginia Trust Co., 181 Va. 497, 25 S.E.2d 33
(1948); see Milner v. Outcalt, 36 Wash. 2d 720, 219 P.2d 982 (1950); 2 Scor, Tnus'rs
§ 153 (2d ed. 1956).
121. E.g., MeCreery v. Johnston, 90 W. Va. 80, 110 S.E. 464 (1922); cf. Meade v.
Rowe's Trustee, 298 Ky. 111, 182 S.W.2d 30 (1944) (creditors reached remainder
since spendthrift clause invalid as applied to a remainder in the absence of provision
for forfeiture and gift over in event clause violated). This position has been adopted
in RESrATEmENT, TR USs § 151 (1935).
Of course, in some cases a contingent future interest will not be available to creditors
anyway (see notes 57-59 supra), and the court need not consider the validity
of the restraint as applied to such interest. E.g., Jones v. Coon, 229 Iowa 756, 295
N.W. 162 (1940).
122. E.g., Perabo v. Gallagher, 241 Mass. 207, 135 N.E. 113 (1922); cf. Meyer v.
Reif, 217 Wis. 11, 258 N.W. 391 (1935) ("support provision" protecting income not
protecting contingent remainder).
123. E.g., Brown v. Lumbert, 221 Mass. 419, 108 N.E. 1079 (1915) (legal remain-
der, by intestacy, outside protective trust reached by creditors); Ellwanger v. Moore,
206 Pa. 234, 55 AtL 966 (1903) (intestate remainder not protected); Estes v. Estes,
267 S.W. 709 (Tex. Com. App. 1924) (legal remainder; trustee's title only life estate);
cf. Albergotti v. Summers, 205 S.C. 179, 31 S.E.2d 129 (1944) (legal remainder after
spendthrift trust not reached because contingent, but if vested it would have been
unprotected and available to creditors).
124. Somers v. O'Brien, 129 Kan. 24, 281 Pac. 888 (1929); Matter of Holzvasser,
177 Misc. 868, 32 N.Y.S.2d 25 (Surr. Ct. 1941); Gillespie's Estate, 273 Pa. 227, 116
At]. 824 (1922).
125. Spann v. Carson, 123 S.C. 371, 116 S.E. 427 (1923). See also Keyser's Appeal,
57 Pa. 236 (1868).
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is expressly provided by the settlor to exclude creditors, a future in-
terest in or following the trust is likely not to be protected as a part
thereof even during the existence of the trust.120
In several states the rule is that creditors cannot reach the interest
of a beneficiary in an active trust created by a person other than the
beneficiary, even though such interest is alienable voluntarily.' 7
Again this protection would not extend to a future interest if it is
found that the statute applies only to income, or that the postponed
right to principal is outside the scope of the trust, or that the trust
is not active as to such interest.12 8
Hence, where a trust is involved, not only must the rights of credi-
tors of typical trust beneficiaries be examined, but it is necessary to
consider the special trust questions presented by the postponement
of the interest. In addition, tnder some of the various state property
rules previously considered, the contingency of a future interest
would preclude creditors from reaching it when other trust interests
would be subject to creditor processes. Consequently, in some in-
stances the future character of the trust interest may enlarge the
rights of creditors while in others it will reduce them.12
The problem is still different when the case is presented under the
Bankruptcy Act. It is sufficient if the future interest is alienable,
and mere immunity of a trust estate from creditors under state law
does not prevent its passage to the bankruptcy trustee.130 Bank-
ruptcy courts do not treat this immunity as an exemption, which they
would have to respect,'13 but look only to the debtor's power to con-
126. (1) The restraint may be invalid as applied to the equitable fu turc right to
principal (note 121 supra); (2) the restraint may be construed to apply only to income
(note 122 supra); and (3) the future interest may be a legal estate (a) "outside" the
trust (note 123 supra) or (b) as a result of having been executed by a Statute of Uses
(note 124 supra), thus invalidating the restraint.
127. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 22, § 49 (Smith-Hurd 1958); MICI. STAT. ANN. § 27.545(0)
(1950); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 498.9 (1955); TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-601 (1950);
WASH. REv. CODE § 6.32.250 (1956).
In several other states there are statutes exempting rents and profits of trust property
to the extent needed for the support and education of the beneficiary. See 2 Sco'rr,
TRusTs § 152.1 (2d ed. 1956). These statutes would afford no direct protection for it
future interest, however, as no income flows from the postponed interest.
128. Koelliker v. Denkinger, 148 Kan. 503, 83 P.2d 703 (1938); Fidelity Uniion
Trust Co. v. Guaranty Trust Co., 135 N.J. Eq. 222, 37 A.2d 853 (Ch. 1944); Bergmann
v. Lord, 194 N.Y. 70, 86 N.E. 828 (1909); ef. Kenwood Trust & Say. Bank v. Pahner,
209 Ill. App. 370 (1918) (remainder followed trust hence not within statute protecting
trust estate, but contingent character nevertheless preserved it).
129. An exhaustive study of these problems may be found in GusWoLD, SPEND-
THI-Fr TRUSTS §§ 81-106 (2d ed. 1947).
130. See, e.g., Young v. Handwork, 179 F.2d 70, (7th Cir. 1949), curt. denied, 339
U.S. 949 (1950), 44 ILL. L. REv. 736, 29 TEXAS L. REv. 251; Horton v. Moore, 110
F.2d 189 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 692 (1940); Patrick v. Beatty, 202 N.C.
454, 163 S.E. 572 (1932).
131. See Bankruptcy Act § 6, 30 Stat. 548 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 24
(1952).
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vey.132 However, a valid spendthrift or discretionary provision will
protect the interest of a trust beneficiary even in bankruptcy, since
such an interest would also be denied voluntary transferability. a3
Equally effective would be a provision that the beneficiarys future
interest should not vest until he becomes solvent or should be for-
feited in the event of bankruptcy.13 4 On the other hand it would
seemingly not suffice to protect a trust interest for the settlor merely
to provide that creditors may not reach it while expressly making the
estate otherwise assignable, since alienability, not merely creditors'
rights as defined by state law, is determinative in bankruptcy. 35
Unless inalienable under local law, a future interest would presum-
ably pass like any other estate in such a trust
Although involving a present right to income, the United States
Supreme Court case of Eaton v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. 30
is relevant to the present discussion. The case has cast some doubt
on the proposition stated above, that a trustee in bankruptcy is en-
titled to a trust interest, despite a locally valid provision against in-
voluntary alienation, if voluntarily assignable. In that case the trust
specified only that creditors of the beneficiary could not reach her
interest but was silent on her right to assign it of her own volition.
The Court held that this property right was not an asset of the bank-
ruptcy estate. Although not definitely stated by the Court, this
result is best explained on the basis of a trust principle that the
presence of one type of restriction may raise a presumption of com-
plete restraint, making the interest inalienable both voluntarily and
involuntarily.13 7 Thus the interest involved was apparently nonas-
132. See note 130 supra. See also note 98 supra and accompanying text.
133. Eaton v. Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 240 U.S. 427 (1916); Danning v.
Lederer, 232 F.2d 610 (7th Cir. 1956); Suskin & Berry v. Rumley, 37 F.2d 304 (4th
Cir. 1930); Jones v. Harrison, 7 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1925), cert. denied sub nom. Jones
v. Ready, 270 U.S. 652 (1926), 11 IowA L. REv. 386; Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co.
v. Collier, 222 Mass. 390, 111 N.E. 163 (1916).
134. Hull v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 245 U.S. 312 (1917) (solvency as condition
precedent; not passing to bankruptcy trustee). A most effective "anti-creditor' device,
at least initially allowing voluntary alienation, is suggested in Miller v. Miller, 127 W.
Va. 140, 31 S.E.2d 844 (1944) (contingent remainder in trust alienable but passage
to trustee prevented by clause providing forfeiture in event of bankruptcy; this result
was reached despite fact that the trustee could thereafter make discretionary payments
to bankraupt). See also Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716 (1875); RESTATENENT, Tnusrs§ 159 (1935).
135. See Bankruptcy Act § 70a, 30 Stat. 565 (1898), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1952),
providing substantially that the bankruptcy trustees title extends to assets either
subject to creditors claims or transferable under state law. Cf. cases cited note 130
supra.
136. 240 U.S. 427 (1916), affirming Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Luke, 220
Mass. 484, 108 N.E. 64 (1915).
137. 2 Scorr, Tausrs § 152.3 (2d ed. 1956). See also 1A Bocmxr, Tnusa's &
Titusr= § 222 (1951) (reinforced by doubt that "partial spendthrift" trusts are
valid).
The opinion by Mr. Justice Holmes indicated that the thinking of the Court was
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signable, though not expressly so declared. This view is also sup-
ported by authority.138 The mere absence of a provision against
voluntary assignment, then, is not fatal where it can be presumed.
Cases of this type must be distinguished from those cases which
would come under the above proposition relating to interests clearly,
but only, assignable voluntarily. Regardless of restraints upon invol-
untary alienation, an equitable future interest should be a bank-
ruptcy asset if voluntary transfer is not prohibited either expressly
or by implication.
V. CONCLUSION
Whether a future interest is legal or equitable, vested or contin-
gent, all that may be sold by or for creditors is, of course, the debt-
orIs interest rather than the trust res or other property to which is
relates. 3 9 Consequently, the buyer's interest does not rise above that
of the debtor, aside from such benefits as might accrue to one having
the status of a good faith purchaser, a matter having nothing to do
with the futurity of the interest.
As has been seen, there is a conflict of opinion whether contingent
future interests should be subject to creditors' claims at all. There are
sound reasons both in favor of and in opposition to making these
interests available to creditors. Whatever position a state may adopt,
it is important that it result from an evaluation of the factors which
are truly relevant rather than technical rules or distinctions which,
for these purposes, at least, ought to be disregarded. It can be hoped
that in the near future all future interests will be freely transferable
everywhere. However, there is little likelihood of uniformity among
the states on questions of involuntary alienation. There seems to be
no clear-cut trend except to the extent explainable by the continued
trend toward voluntary alienability, without which the creditor
problem is foreclosed. And there is no solution which has been
generally accepted as representing both a satisfactory resolution
of conflicting policy considerations and as a test which is prac-
tical of application. A good solution would be one along the lines
of the Massachusetts rule, 140 or one allowing execution except where
equity finds it preferable to grant a lien and postpone sale.
along these lines, expressing doubt that the result would have been the same If the
beneficiary's estate had been clearly assignable. 240 U.S. at 428-29.
138. King v. United States, 84 F.2d 156 (1st Cir. 1936) (holding similar interest
in same state not voluntarily assignable, relying on Eaton case). See also Shankland's
Appeal, 47 Pa. 113 (1864).
139. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 166 (1936) (subject to all contingencies and with
all potentialities as such interest possessed in hands of debtor). If debtor is solo bene-
ficiary under a trust, a court of equity may order sale of res free of trust, 2 Scorr,
TRUSTS § 147.2 (2d ed. 1956), but this is unlikely where the interest sought is a
future interest.
140. Discussed in text at notes 83-86 supra.
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Because of its influence on state policy and its breadth of applica-
tion, the bankruptcy rule is of utmost importance. Under this rule,
all future interests which are freely alienable pass to the bankruptcy
trustee. Under present law, it seems incorrect to hold that the trustee
is also entitled to those interests having only aberrational forms of
alienability. The present act, properly construed, has adopted a good
position and has gone as far as is reasonable in allowing present sale
for benefit of creditors. However, two suggestions should be con-
sidered. First, there might be an extension of the period during
which the vesting of an inalienable contingent estate will convert it
to a bankruptcy asset. Some such extension could be made without
ordinarily delaying the administration of the few estates which would
be affected.41 It is not suggested, however, that there be a change
in the related provision in section 70a for bequests, devises and in-
heritances. As part of this recommendation, the limitation of the
present provision to real property interests ought to be reconsidered.
The second proposal which might be considered would supersede
the first. It offers a complete solution to the problem if Congress ac-
cepts the underlying policy against allowing existing contingent fu-
ture interests of debtors in certain states to survive bankruptcy
merely because technically, though not practically, inalienable. This
proposal is that all reversions, remainders, whether vested or con-
tingent, executory limitations and devises, possibilities of reverter
and rights of entry pass to the bankruptcy trustee.12 If an interest
is inalienable under state law or if it is decided that it is inadvisable
to presently sell an alienable future interest, it would be treated as
141. The inadequacy of the present six-month period is criticized in MAcLAcmAN,
B x uprcy § 178 (1956).
142. See the enumeration in the Bankruptcy Act § 70a(7), 30 Stat. 565 (1898), as
amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (7) (1952), providing that
(a) The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt ... shall in turn be vested by operation
of law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the petition initi-
ating a proceeding under this title, except insofar as it is to property which is held
to be exempt, to all of the following kinds of property wherever located ...
(7) contingent remainders, executory devises and limitations, rights of entry for
condition broken, rights or possibilities of reverter, and like interests in real prop-
erty, which were assignable prior to bankruptcy and which, within six months
thereafter, become assignable interests or estates or give rise to powers in the
bankrupt to acquire assignable interests or estates ...
Under the proposal in the text, the interests there named would become "property"
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, whether or not so designated by state law.
Perhaps a phrase similar to "like interests in real property," included in the quote
from the Bankruptcy Act, supra, could be included in the revision so that interests
not so designated by state law would be within its provisions. The substance of section
70a(7) would be eliminated from the act, since under the proyosed revision title to
the property does not turn on whether or not the property is assignable," but upon
the nature of the interest. Enumeration of the interests excludes those expectancies
which might be classified as mere hopes, e.g., the extent to which a named legatee or
devisee "expects" to participate in an estate after the death of the testator.
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an unadministered asset of the bankrupt estate which could other-
wise be closed with discharge granted. Sale would be postponed un-
til the interest is both transferable under state law and salable with
fairness to creditors and the bankrupt. This rule would respect state
policy against transfer of certain future interests, and it would ex-
pressly authorize the avoidance of unusually harsh forced sales of
alienable interests. At the same time it would prevent generally
recognized future interests, such as those enumerated above, from
permanently escaping bankruptcy creditors as a result of peculiar
state rules. The only real departure from the present law would be
a codification of the Landis rule with a requirement that sale be
postponed, plus an emphasis upon exercise of existing equity power
over bankruptcy sales.'43
These proposals for further expansion of creditors' rights under
the Bankruptcy Act are justifiable on several grounds. First, either
would represent a stride toward uniformity of rights in bankruptcy
throughout the country, achieving nearly the same result as obtained
in the majority of states which permit free alienability. While federal
policy has preferred the preservation of local exemptions over uni-
formity, the immunity of a contingent interest is not in the nature
of an exemption.'" Second, there are, contrary to certain very re-
spectable authorities, 145 special reasons for differentiating bank-
ruptcy from individual proceedings as related to these interests:
(a) in bankruptcy, unlike state court proceedings, the debtor is typi-
cally discharged and most creditors therefore lose all subsequent
rights to seek relief or to await the occurrence of a precedent condi-
tion; (b) execution sales are particularly unsuitable markets for
contingent future interests, while a bankruptcy trustee is able to
143. See recognition of general equity powers in Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284
U.S. 225 (1931).
In holding that a contingent remainder passed to the bankruptcy trustee, the court
In re Reifsteck, 71 F. Supp. 157 (E.D. Ill. 1947), pointed out that there remained a
matter of discretion on the question of whether to postpone its sale. The way in which a
state court of equity might react is illustrated by Meyer v. Reif, 217 Wis. 11, 258 N.W.
391 (1935), discussed at text accompanying note 88 supra. See Slocum v. Edwards,
168 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1948), illustrating the power of courts over bankruptcy sales
of contingent interests and the power to declare such an interest an unadministered
asset by setting aside a sale for inadequate consideration, based on a "finding of mis-
take," long after the estate had been closed when the interest turned out to have
great value.
144. Denial of execution is generally based on a theory of sacrifice rather than
relating to the minimum needs of the debtor or to public policy to encourage the
holding of certain assets. Contingent remainders have never been compared in the
cases to homestead, tools of trade, or insurance. See examples of nonrecognition in
bankruptcy of state immunity, notes 98, 130 supra.
145. See, e.g., 2 POWELL, Rx-AL PaoERTY § 287 (1950); RSTATEMENT, PRoPJMTY,
Introductory Note ch. 10, § 168, at 624 (1936). The view of such authorities is that
extensions of rights of creditors in bankruptcy places a premium on costly proceedings.
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deal more advantageously with such property; "' (c) bankruptcy
courts, being endowed with equitable powers, can provide the flexi-
bility of administration so vital in this situation. Third, the argu-
ments for uniformity of state and federal remedies are peculiarly
weak in this area. It is argued that it is inadvisable to encourage the
use of expensive procedures by making them more inviting to credi-
tors. In this case the result may be to lessen the attractiveness of vol-
untary bankruptcy as a method by which the "propertied" debtor
may obtain permanent relief from his debts while depleting the
estate from which his creditors may seek payment. This seems to be
a more real problem in these cases.14r The debtor may also be en-
couraged to voluntarily dispose of his "inalienable" interest in equity
for a consideration with which to pay off creditors. State property
law, being outdated where contingent future interests are inalien-
able, would be pressed toward modernization by federal leadership
on this matter. Federal-state uniformity has not been a major policy
in bankruptcy, especially in this particular area. 14 The existence of
some deviations from state rules does not necessarily justify others,
but it does point out that the desire for such uniformity yields when
good reasons exist, even if the result is to encourage somewhat the
use of bankruptcy proceedings.149 Finally, it has been seen that even
where contingent future interest are held inalienable, they are vir-
tually transferable for the benefit of the owner.
146. That sales under bankruptcy procedures are preferable generally, see In ro
Casaudomecq, 46 F. Supp. 718, 724 (S.D. Cal. 1942). The advantages are even more
pronounced where speculative future interests are to be liquidated. Since the oppor-
tunities offered by private sale exist, the ability to seek out an interested purchaser
would be especially valuable. Particularly important is the possibility of negotiating a
release to a person already interested in the property. The owner of the estate to be
divested by the future interest might pay well to perfect his title, particularly if he is
the holder of a determinable fee and the bankrupt estate contains an executory interest
or possibility of reverter. The holder of an alternative contingent remainder, or its
functional equivalent, may pay an actuarially fair consideration to "hedge" or eliminate
his risks. On the other hand, the owner of a preceding or alternative interest may be
induced to sell his estate, in conjunction with the trustee, to one who would pay the
full actuarial value of each estate to acquire a secure or perfect title. The exhaustion
of such opportunities for fair sale could be expected in bankruptcy, but one could not
rely on a public execution sale to come to the attention of such buyers. On the subject
of bankruptcy sale and related powers of the trustee, see 4 CoLLmE, BAmn-p1cy §§
70.97-.98 (14th ed. 1942).
147. See reasons for adding, under section 70a, the six-month period following
bankruptcy during which trustee acquires title to future interests and expectancies
vesting in the debtor. See H.. 12889, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); MacLachlan,
Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 Hnv. L. BEv. 588, 609 (1931).
148. In bankruptcy, state policy on forced sale has been completely ignored where
the future interest is transferable. See text at note 98 supra.
149. An excellent example of a substantial additional power of a trustee under the
Bankruptcy Act is his power to avoid certain preferences. See Bankruptcy Act § 60b,
30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1952), the basic justification
being the equitable distribution to creditors under the act.
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A complete solution of these problems in bankruptcy, especially in
eradicating untenable distinctions which result from the peculiar
rules found in certain jurisdictions, must ultimately depend on de-
velopment of state law governing the voluntary alienation of future
interests. In the rights of creditors under state law, reforms are most
needed to obtain similar treatment for functional equivalents within
a given jurisdiction and to resolve these future interests problems on
the basis of the real policy issues involved.
